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This paper explores the procurement of public buildings in local authorities in the UK 
under the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) and its consequences for small and medium 
sized enterprises. Following an outline of the development of PFI in the UK, the paper 
explains the peculiarities of local authorities’ involvement. Opportunities and problems 
of smaller constructors in such PFI projects are then analysed. Three case studies of 
smaller PFI schemes are reviewed including procurement process, contract agreement, 
project funding, risk allocation and innovations. Because of complicated approval 
frameworks and contract structures more and more projects are bundled in order to 
obtain a better value for money. Smaller constructors, therefore, can only act as 
subcontractors until simpler procedures and contracts are introduced by government 
bodies and organisations responsible. 
 
JEL – classification:  H54, H57, L33, L74 







„Die Beteiligung kleiner und mittelständischer Unternehmen bei der privaten 
Realisierung öffentlicher Bauten“ 
 
Die vorliegende Arbeit setzt sich mit der Beschaffung öffentlicher Gebäude in 
Kommunen in UK im Rahmen der Private Finance Initiative (PFI) und den daraus 
resultierenden Folgen für klein und mittelständische Betriebe auseinander. Nach einem 
kurzen Überblick über die PFI in UK werden die Besonderheiten für Kommunen im 
Rahmen der PFI deutlich gemacht. Die Möglichkeiten und Probleme der kleineren 
Baubetriebe sind dabei genauer untersucht worden. Drei Fallstudien kleinerer PFI 
Projekte wurden anhand der Kriterien Beschaffungsprozess, Vertragsgestaltung, 
Projektfinanzierung, Risikoverteilung und Neuerungen ausgearbeitet und analysiert. 
Aufgrund komplexer Bewilligungsverfahren und Vertragsgebilde werden immer mehr 
Projekte gebündelt um einen besseren Mehrwert zu erzielen. Kleinere Baubetriebe 
agieren dabei nur als Subunternehmer, solange keine Vereinfachungen durch die 
zuständigen Behörden und Organisationen realisiert werden. 
 
JEL – Klassifikation: H54, H57, L33, L74 
Schlagworte: Privatwirtschaftliche Realisierung, Infrastruktur, KMU, 
Kommunalverwaltung 




A criticism of the British Private Finance Initiative (PFI) frequently put forward is the 
claim that it is not suitable for small and medium sized enterprises (SME’s). The 
research work presented here is aimed at investigating this argument in depth. The SME 
projects examined, a primary school, a fire station and a police station, demonstrate the 
problems that SME’s had to face in the realisation of these projects. These have 
included substantial transaction costs due to insufficient contractual standardisation and 
reservations of banking organisations in respect of longer term stability of SME’s. 
 
The intention of the Working Paper is to help avoid us in Germany to go through the 
same learning curve, especially to ensure that the contractor-led model of private 
realisation of public infrastructure is designed to be more SME friendly. The German 
speciality of state and co-operative banks, who are the predominant financiers of 
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1 Introduction 
Ten years ago the government thought about new ways of delivering public 
infrastructure by involving more private sector skills and management expertise than 
had usually occurred under traditional procurement. The overall aim was to deliver 
public infrastructure projects with better value for money. The introduction of PFI has 
been a very successful method of providing public sector infrastructure. At first, the 
Private Finance Initiative could only be used for central government infrastructure 
projects, but changes in legislation made it possible for local government to use this 
new model to deliver new infrastructure as well. The study will especially focus on the 
procurement of public buildings within local government as part of public 
infrastructure. 
 
Small and medium sized enterprises have been responsible for the construction of most 
public buildings within local government before the introduction of new ways of 
procurement, such as the Private Finance Initiative. It is one aim of this study to 
investigate whether this situation has now changed or not. Therefore, it is essential to 
identify which aspects are important or unique to the Private Finance Initiative within 
local government, which restrictions exist and how local authorities are reacting. 
 
Furthermore, case studies are used to reveal first hand information on small public 
building projects procured under the Private Finance Initiative within local government. 
Information that the case studies have brought to light is analysed and evaluated in 
order to make recommendations for the involvement of small and medium sized 
enterprises in the future. 
 
Thus, the study highlights some important aspects for both local authorities and small 
and medium sized enterprises, who want to evaluate the chances and risks of becoming 
involved in the procurement of public buildings under the Private Finance Initiative. 
 
2  The Private Finance Initiative 
2.1  What is PFI? 
The Private Finance Initiative (PFI) transforms Government Departments and Agencies 
from being owners and operators of assets into purchasers of services from the private 
sector. It is important to mention that PFI is not about borrowing money from the 
private sector. PFI is all about creating a structure in which improved value for money 
is achieved through private sector innovation and management skills delivering 
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significant performance improvement, efficiency gains and potentially huge benefits to 
the taxpayer. There are currently three main types of PFI transactions [URL 1]. 
 
Services sold to the public sector 
The private sector is responsible for the capital investment and the public sector only 
pays on the delivery of specified services to specified quality standards. Those projects 
are generally procured by the DBFO route. 
 
Financially free standing projects 
The private sector recovers its DBFO contract costs through direct charges to users (e.g. 
tolling) rather than from public sector payments. Public sector involvement is limited to 




Joint ventures involve projects where the entire costs cannot be recovered through 
charges on the end users. The government offers a part-subsidy in order to enable the 
project to go ahead. 
 
When handled well, the PFI can work to the mutual advantage of users of public 
services, taxpayers and companies seeking new business opportunities. However, the 
challenge is considerable. Only by setting out clear priorities and establishing a user-
friendly framework within which both the public and private sectors are happy to 
operate, can the Government make the PFI work as well as it should. 
 
2.2  The History of PFI 
The PFI is not a new idea. Italy, France and Spain have used private finance for 
building motorways for many years whereas Australia, New Zealand and the United 
States have been using private finance in prison, road and hospital buildings. 
 
Private finance of public infrastructure in England has its origins in the late seventeenth 
century with inadequate levels of government and local community spending for public 
infrastructure but with an existing need for the construction of turnpike roads, the 
construction of canals and the construction of public railway systems. At this point in 
time, the private sector took the initiative to establish new infrastructure. Due to 
increasing government control over competition and an increasingly powerful labour 
market the private investment in public sector infrastructure had declined sharply by the 
end of the nineteenth century [URL 2]. 
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In the early 1990’s, the government faced a lack of sufficient public funds to adequately 
improve public sector infrastructure. That situation forced the government to create 
innovative solutions, which would secure needed investments in public infrastructure 
without further increasing the PSBR. Probably the biggest step for government to 
achieve this aim was to stop being reluctant using the private sector expertise as much 
as they could, opening the way for a better use of public funding. 
 
2.2.1 PFI  before  1997 
The “Private Finance Initiative” was formally introduced by the British Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, Norman Lamont, in November 1992. Until then, the use of private 
capital for the funding of public assets had been restricted by the Ryrie Rules. The 
government saw two main benefits in the adoption of PFI as a popular procurement 
method. 
 
First, traditional public procurement was characterised by high cost and time overruns 
and the government perceived that the PFI would offer improved value for money 
through the accelerated completion and more efficient operation of assets. 
 
Second, if sufficient risk was transferred to the private sector, then the subsequent 
service payments could be described as current rather than capital expenditure with the 
result of a decreasing PSBR [URL 3]. In autumn 1993, a rudimentary structure was 
created to support the initiative consisting of bodies known as the Private Finance Panel 
and Private Finance Panel Executive. Nevertheless, the main output of the PFI between 
1992 and 1997 only comprised a handful of basic Private Finance Panel publications 
and the number of new projects emerging from the public sector was viewed as poor. 
Reasons for the perceived shortcomings were: 
•  The uncertainty of the public and private sector as to how PFI worked. 
•  Protracted negotiations due to legal contractual disputes. 
•  Highly detailed output specifications that restricted the degree of innovation 
put in place by the tenderer. 
•  Unrealistic government views on risk allocation. 
•  The inappropriate use of PFI in small scale projects alongside an insufficient 
administrative system which had to facilitate the tendering process, control 
changes, settle disputes and thereby increased the high costs of bidding. 
•  Reluctance of the public sector to appreciate the value of the contribution 
that the private sector could make. 
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•  Ongoing criticism from the Labour opposition, which was correctly 
presumed during that period to be a government-in-waiting. 
 
2.2.2   PFI post 1997 
The arrival of the new government in May 1997 produced a new opportunity for the 
Labour government to evaluate PFI as a method of procurement. Their first task was to 
announce a review of the PFI under the chairmanship of Malcolm Bates, chairman of 
Pearl Assurance, called the ‘Bates Review’. That first Bates Review made 29 
recommendations, the most significant of which was that only viable projects should be 
brought forward for consideration as a PFI project [URL 4].  The Private Finance Panel 
and the Private Finance Panel Executive were replaced by a Treasury Task Force. Price 
Waterhouse Coopers were engaged to train certain civil servants to become PFI 
specialists. To limit bid costs, it was recommended that it become compulsory not to 
shortlist more than four bidders. In the event of cancelling the project at a late stage by 
the purchasing department, compensation may now be paid to bidders provided that the 
decision not to proceed was not related to the viability of the tenders received. 
 
A second Bates review of the PFI was completed in March 1999. This has led to the 
replacement of the Treasury Taskforce by the newly formed Partnerships UK. 
 
2.3  Organisations promoting PFI 
2.3.1 Partnerships UK 
Partnerships UK emerged out of the Treasury Taskforce (TTF). The TTF consisted of a 
policy team and a project team. This structure was broken up in such a way that the 
policy team became integrated into the Office of Government Commerce (OGC), which 
is a wholly public sector organisation forming a part of the Treasury. This means, for 
example, that the work on standardisation of contracts, which was one of the TTF tasks, 
has now transferred to the Policy Unit of the OGC, who are now responsible for issuing 
new standardised contract documentation. The projects arm of the TTF, which 
represented most externally visible activities, has been handed over to Partnerships UK. 
 
Partnerships UK itself is a company with 51% owned by the private sector and 49% 
owned by Government. An Advisory Board was set up with its first meeting in January 
2001. It is a mix of some Permanent Secretaries, experienced practitioners and key 
existing clients. The board will meet twice a year and PUK will report to them on a 
historical basis and will outline plans for the future [URL 5]. 
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The main tasks of Partnerships UK include of the following: 
•  Acting as a Public Private Partnership developer by working in partnership 
with public bodies. 
•  Continuing much of the work of the TTF by overseeing actual projects, 
having a contract with the Treasury for providing a help desk for the public 
sector on PFI and supporting them in producing further standardisation in 
respect of best practise developing in the market. 
•  Participating jointly with public sector promoters in the development of 
individual projects and working alongside external advisers. 
•  Provision of risk capital to bridge the gap between traditional equity and 
senior debt in IT schemes through mezzanine financing. 
 
The interests of PUK are aligned with those of the public body. PUK and the public 
body share the costs of development and procurement of Public Private Partnerships. If 
a project fails, Partnerships UK loses some or all of its money. If it is a success, PUK 
and the public body share the benefits. 
 
However, the involvement of Partnerships UK is not only confined to the development 
of Public Private Partnerships. It will also participate in Wider Market Initiatives and in 
the development of the UK waterways network. Furthermore, there will be a 
Commercialisation Unit for Science and Technology, which is trying to find new 
opportunities to create new businesses on the back of developments sponsored and 
founded in scientific and technological research in the public sector. Therefore, a new 
team has been established within Partnerships UK to work with PSRE’s to come up 
with ideas and developments for commercial exploitation. 
 
2.3.2 The 4P’s 
Established in 1996, the 4P’s are a dedicated unit to assist local authorities to develop 
and deliver PFI schemes and other partnership initiatives. Funded primarily by 
government grant, the 4P’s are able to offer their services free of charge to local 
government. Being accountable to a board appointed by the Local Government 
Association, the 4P’s provide guidance and are developing case studies and contractual 
documentation to encourage successful approaches to be replicated in other authorities. 
 
Rt. Hon. Nick Raynsford, former Minister for Local Government and the Regions 
stated: 
"PFI in Local Government is helping to develop and improve public services. 4Ps 
provides invaluable advice and support to Local Authorities using the PFI route for 
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project financing. 4P’s consultancy advice and guidance have played a vital role in 
ensuring the success of the £7 billion Local Government PFI programme." [URL 6] 
 
Councillor Richard Kemp, Chair of the 4P’s, recently commented that the work of the 
4P’s is divided into four distinct categories: 
1.  Representing the needs of local government to central government by employing 
executives who are respected as neutral and factual as they advocate change and 
initiatives. 
2.  Providing standardised procedures to enable everyone to learn from previous 
experience with all the expertise of the 4P’s available to local governments on 
their website (www.4ps.co.uk). 
3.  To bring together council staff to share the learning experience, realised either 
by conferences or by regularly convening sector specific meetings of councils 
going through PFI procurement. 
4.  To work within the local and central government family to raise the standard of 
debate about the relationship between the public and private sectors [URL 7]. 
 
The LGA Executive has just agreed in principle to an enhanced link up between the 
4P’s and the IDeA to enable the 4P’s to do even more for local government, expanding 
their work in fields of training and support and the provision of a help desk for local 
authorities. 
 
3  Local Government and PFI 
During the early days of PFI, local government was merely an onlooker, unable to join. 
However, the government recognised that a system needed to be set up that enabled 
local authorities to enter into private finance transactions. There are three main reasons 
for this. 
 
Firstly, local government means very big business. It accounts for approximately 25% 
of all public sector expenditure. Secondly, local government offers a strong covenant to 
bankers, and are strong partners to potential private sector partners. Thirdly, there have 
been years of under-investment in vital infrastructure and capital allocations available 
for ‘traditional’ procurement will continue to decline. Unless an authority is rich in 
reserves, PFI is the only way to secure capital investment. 
 
Nowadays, over 100 local authorities are working to deliver often complex PFI 
agreements. There are 174 PFI projects in procurement, which are endorsed by the 
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Project Review Group (PRG). Figure 1 gives a detailed overview of projects according 






























































































































  Figure 1: Projects Approved by PRG [URL 8] 
 
For further information, Table 1 shows the allocation of PFI credits by sponsoring 
department, and gives an outlook until 2004. 
 
PFI Funding by Sponsoring Department and Financial Years in million 
Sponsoring 
Department 
1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04  Total 
DETR 
(a)  149 200 250 250 332 565 685  2,431 
DfEE  22  130 350 350 450 550 650  2,502 
Home 
Office 
41  80  100 100 100 125 125 671 
DoH  37 30 30 30 40 40 40  247 
LCD  0  60 70 70 70 70 70  410 
DCMS 0  0  0  0  30  30  30  90 
Joined-Up  0 0 0  30  30  0 0  60 
Total  249 500 800 830  1052  1380  1600  6411 
(a)  It includes the 8 waste management projects which belong now to the new department DEFRA; DETR was 
transformed into DTLR in 2000. 
(b)  DfEE has been transformed into DFES in 2000. 
Table 1: PFI Credits by Sponsoring Department [URL 9] 
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3.1  Structure of Local Government 
Different countries set up their government structure in different ways. This can be 
extended to the regional level. For a real understanding of the PFI in local authorities, it 
is essential to know how local government in the UK is structured. Therefore, issues 
such as “Who is acting as a local authority?” and “What services are the responsibility 
of a specific local authorities?” need to be addressed. 
 
The first major restructuring of local government in England outside London came into 
effect on 1
st April, 1974. A new structure of 6 metropolitan county councils
1 and 39 
shire counties, divided into 36 metropolitan and 296 non-metropolitan districts had been 
created. Such a local government structure is called a two-tier system, which was also in 
place in Wales and similarly in Scotland. In 1986, the Greater London Council and the 
metropolitan county councils were abolished. The remaining functions of the Greater 
London Council were transferred to City of London, London Boroughs, Inner London 
Education Authority, the London Fire and Civil Defence Authority, the London Waste 
Regulation Authority and other bodies. The functions of the metropolitan county 
councils were passed to the metropolitan districts
2, to waste disposal authorities, to joint 
authorities for police, fire and civil defence, and transport [URL 10] p.2, see Table 3. 
The Inner London Education Authorities were abolished in 1990 and the responsibility 
for education in Inner London was transferred to the London Boroughs. 
 
From 1
st April, 1996, the two-tier system in Wales and Scotland and to some extent in 
England changed to a one-tier system consisting of unitary councils. By 1998, 5 county 
councils and 59 district councils in England had been replaced by 46 unitary councils 
[URL 11]. The unitary councils run all local government services in their areas except 
for the Police. It should be noted that all London borough councils and metropolitan 
borough councils are unitary councils. Table 2 on page 12 helps to illustrate this. 
                                                 
1 Those were Greater Manchester, Merseyside, South Yorkshire, Tyne and Wear, West Midlands, and 
West Yorkshire. 
2 Also known as Metropolitan Borough Councils. 
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Single-Tier Authorities 
  22  Welsh Unitary Councils 
  32  Scottish Unitary Councils 
  26  Northern Ireland Councils 
  46  English Shire Unitary Councils 
  32  London Boroughs (see below for the Greater 
London Authority) 
  1  Corporation/City of London (see below for the 
Greater London Authority) 
36 Metropolitan  Borough  Councils 
•  West Midlands area: (7 borough councils) 
•  Merseyside area: (5 borough councils) 
•  Greater Manchester area: (10 borough councils) 
•  South Yorkshire area: (4 borough councils) 
•  West Yorkshire area: (5 borough councils) 
•  Tyne & Wear area: (5 borough councils) 
Two-Tier Authorities in England 
 34  County  Councils 
 238 District  Councils 
  Table 2: Structure of Local Authorities in the UK [URL 12] p.1, [URL 13] p.2 
 
The brief description of local government structure is summarised in Table 3 on page 
13, depicting some major areas serviced by local government in England and the local 
authority responsible for it.  
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or 
Unitary Councils        
Education   •  •    • •   
Housing   •   •   • •   
Planning 
applications   •   •   • •   
Strategic 
planning   •    •   •  • • 
Transport 
planning   •    •   •  • • 
Passenger 
transport 
(a)  •   •        • 
Highways 
(b)   •  •    • •   
Police  •      • •   • 
Fire 
(c)  •   •        • 
Social 
services   •  •    • •   
Libraries   •  •    • •   
Leisure and 
recreation   •   •   • •   
Waste 
collection  •   •     •  •  
Waste 
disposal 
(d)  •   •    • •   
Environmental 
health   •   •   • •   
Local 
taxation   •   •   • •   
Legend 
 • 
   
Local government services and their responsible authority, according to [URL 14]. 
Local government services and their responsible authority differing from [URL 14], 
according to [URL 12] and [URL 13]. 
(a) Transport for London (TfL) has responsibility for London buses and in 2001 is expected to  
      have responsibility for London Underground Ltd. 
(b) Transport for London (TfL) is the highway’s authority for about 5% of London roads 
(c) Combined fire authorities are responsible for fire services in the shire areas affected by  
      reorganisation from April 1996 onwards. 
(d) Waste disposal for some areas of London is carried out by separate waste disposal 
      authorities. The GLA has strategic, but not operational, responsibility for municipal waste. 
Table 3: Responsibilities for major local government services 
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3.2  The Financial Framework for Local Authorities 
For a better understanding of financial matters with regards to PFI transactions from a 
local authority’s point of view, it is essential to provide an overview of the financial 
framework under which local authorities operate. The function of this framework is to 
control aggregate public expenditure, encourage efficiency and to ensure that the 
relative needs of different authorities are taken into account when national resources are 
distributed. This framework can be differentiated into expenditure charged to a revenue 
account and expenditure on capital assets. 
 
3.2.1 Revenue  Expenditure 
Revenue expenditures, also known as current expenditures, mainly focus on pay and 
other costs of running services except council housing. The following information is 
derived from ‘A plain English guide to the Local Government Finance Settlement’ 
[URL 15] and a House of Commons research paper ‘Local Government Finance in 
England’ [URL 16]. 
 
The government starts with calculating a Standard Spending Assessment (SSA) for each 
local authority by taking into account the population, social structure and other 
characteristics of each authority. Formulas for major service areas
3 have been 
developed. The SSA of all local authorities, plus special and specific grants funding 
special services, makes up Total Standard Spending (TSS). About 75% to 80% of the 
TSS is paid by Government, also known as Aggregate External Finance (AEF), the 
remaining gap is financed through Council Taxes raised by each individual local 
authority. The AEF is made up of the special and specific grants, the redistributed 
amount of business rates and the Revenue Support Grant (RSG). Business rates
4 are 
paid by occupiers of non-domestic properties to billing authorities and are then passed 
to the Government. Thus, they are out of control of local government. The business 
rates are redistributed to local authorities on a per capita basis. The RSG of a local 
authority is: 
•  its Standard Spending Assessment; less 
•  the amount it will get from the national pool of business rates; less 
•  the amount it would get if it sets its Council Tax at a national standard rate. 
 
                                                 
3 Those areas are education, personal social services, police, fire, highway maintenance, environmental, 
protective and cultural services and capital financing. 
4 Also known as National Non-Domestic Rates (NNDR). 
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The RSG is paid in a lump sum and the Government can not influence the local 
authorities’ spending plans. The Council Tax, based on valuation bands, is paid by the 
residents of domestic properties to the local authority. If a local authority sets its budget 
requirement at the level of its SSA, the Council Tax would be the same for all properties 
in the same valuation band throughout England. Generally, the budget requirement 
differs from the SSA of a local authority. The amount of Council Tax an authority needs 
to raise is the gap between the budget requirement and the funding it will receive from 
the Government according to its SSA. Even if an authority’s budget requirement 
succeeds its SSA only slightly it would lead to a significant increase of Council Tax. 
This is due to the fact that the Council Tax only accounts for about 20% to 25% of the 
total budget. This puts a major political restraint on local authority expenditure and is 
called the gearing effect. The Government also has the power to cap a budget 
requirement if it considers that the budget requirement and Council Tax are excessive. 
The Government exercises its power in order to protect Council Tax payers from large 
rises in their Council Tax bills. Examples of calculating the Council Tax and the 
Revenue Support Grant can be found in Appendix A. 
 
3.2.2 Capital  Expenditure 
Expenditure not being charged to the revenue account must be of a capital nature. This 
includes expenditure on the acquisition of a fixed asset, adds to the value or extends the 
useful life of an existing asset. It is normally funded from capital grants paid by 
Government, external contribution or internal capital receipts
5. The present legislative 
framework governing capital expenditure by local authorities is the Local Government 
and Housing Act 1989. Credit arrangements are another way of obtaining the use of 
capital assets. They require a credit cover and the full value of this expenditure scores 
against the authority’s capital resources in the year that the contract begins. PFI in local 
government works within this framework. But there are rules in place under the current 
Capital Finance System that “credit arrangements
6, which are structured as private 
finance transactions
7 and meet other certain criteria
8, do not require credit cover and 
may qualify for revenue support from Central Government towards the capital cost of 
such schemes” [URL 17] p.17. 
 
                                                 
5 Capital receipts means income from the sale of assets and repayment of advances. 
6 See Section 48 of the Local Government and Housing Act 1989. 
7 Regulation 16 – see 3.3.2.1. 
8 Regulation 40 – see 3.3.2.2. 
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3.3  The Legal Framework for PFI in Local Government 
While PFI was launched in 1992 for central government, no PFI project was signed in 
local government until 1997. This was due to significant aspects, whereby local 
authorities differ from other public bodies. Some important differences, published in 
The Standardisation of Local Authority PFI Contracts [URL 17] pp.15-17, are that they: 
“ • occupy a particular position in the Constitution, in the sense that each Local 
Authority is a wholly independent and autonomous entity, responsible 
individually for the deals they strike and contracts they enter into, yet Local 
Authorities derive the majority of their funding from central Government and 
are, as a consequence, subject to central Government regulation and control; 
  • are directly elected bodies accountable to local service users and Council Tax 
payers; 
  • have a community leadership role, as facilitated by the Local Government Act 
2000 to promote the social, economic and environmental wellbeing of the 
community; 
  • have decision-making procedures which vary from Local Authority to Local 
Authority particularly with respect to the level to which decisions on different 
matters may be delegated; 
  • are monitored by various inspectorates which are responsible for laying down 
standards, for example, the Audit Commission, the Social Services Inspectorate, 
and OFSTED; 
 •  are required to comply with the Best Value performance management 
framework and the duties set out in the Local Government Act 1999, to have 
regard to Best Value Performance Indicators (BVPIs)(7) and to set five-year 
achievement targets to improve performance to a standard at least equivalent by 
the top quartile of authorities. This statutory performance management 
framework will have an impact on the setting of contractual targets and the 
formulation of Best Value Reviews and performance plans; 
  • are public bodies, governed by public law duties and responsibilities such as the 
well known principles set out in the Wednesbury case and are obliged to comply 
with the EU procurement regime and other EU Treaty obligations; 
  • Are creatures of statute which can perform activities only if statutory powers 
can be identified.  One consequence of this is that whilst Local Authorities have 
freedom to contract, they may only do so in pursuance of their statutory 
functions and in accordance with legislation which has been introduced to 
control local government borrowing and transactions akin to borrowing.” 
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After their election in 1997, the Labour Government tried to remove the barriers by 
establishing rules and guidelines for PFI in local government. An essential role thereby 
played the removal of the ultra vires concerns and the inclusion of private finance 
transaction into the Capital Finance Regulations. Those issues will be next to be 
addressed. Furthermore, administrative arrangements for approving additional revenue 
support for PFI schemes will be explained in section 3.4. 
 
3.2.1 Statutory  Powers 
As mentioned before, local authorities are creatures of Statute and can only act where 
they have specific power to do so. Acting outside those powers can have serious 
consequences rendering transactions entered into void, also known as acting “ultra 
vires”. Very well known cases of local authorities acting outside their powers are: 
“Credit Suisse v Allerdale DC, Credit Suisse v Waltham Forest LBC and Morgan 
Grenfell v Sutton LBC” [URL 18]. 
 
In order to remove the “vires” concern, the Local Government (Contracts) Act 1997 was 
introduced. The main objectives that Act addresses are: 
•  Clarifying the powers of a local authority to contract with the private sector. 
•  Allowing local authorities to have “step-in” rights if the contractor gets into 
financial difficulties. 
•  Enabling local authorities to certify long-term service contracts, providing 
them “safe harbour” protection from legal challenge except by judicial or 
audit review; and 
•  Ensuring that the contractor will be compensated if a contract is ever set 
aside in such a review, also politely called the “relevant discharge terms”. 
 
The approach to “vires” issues under the 1997 Act is one of the features unique to local 
government and is completely different to legislation covering similar issues in other 
sectors. 
 
3.2.2  Capital Finance Regulations 
Beside having the power to enter into PFI transactions, local authorities must comply 
with the rules governing local authorities capital investments. The two most important 
regulations, defined in the Capital Finance Regulations, facilitating PFI for local 
government are contained in regulation 16 and regulation 40. Those regulations form 
the basis for giving capital finance concessions and revenue support for PFI in local 
government. The regulations are kept under review by Government and have been 
subject to change during the last two years. Those changes were necessary to bring the 
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regulations more into line with the local government ‘Best Value’ regime and the PFI 
principles, which were being recommended by general guidance elsewhere in the public 
sector. 
 
3.3.2.1 Private Finance Transaction – Regulation 16 
Regulation 16 defines the features of a transaction which are needed for qualification as 
a PFI transaction, also called a Private Finance Transaction (PFT). 
 
A Private Finance Transaction is defined in Appendix B (section 16 (2)(a)(i, ii)). The 
remaining features included in regulation 16 are summarised, so that: 
•  the authority pays fees provided by the contract; 
•  the fees payable are performance based or a measure of usefulness of the 
asset or both; 
•  the payment commences only when the services have started to be provided; 
•  the transfer of an asset by the authority, typically land, can be included as 
part of the contract; and 
•  the terms of the contract can provide for lump-sum payments. 
 
Regulation 16 has been amended several times with the last amendment put in place on 
the 23
rd July 1999. The current regulation is included in the Appendix . Regarding the 
payable fees, there are no restrictions on the reduction in fees. Profit sharing agreements 
for income by the contractor from third parties as well as benchmarking arrangements 
resulting in a downward revision of prices are facilitated by the regulations. The 
restrictions on the price variations for an increase of the fees were removed by the last 
amendment of regulation 16. According to the general guidance, the increase in fees is, 
for example, permitted due to indexation by reference to any agreed index, changes in 
VAT scope, payments for late service commencement occurred by compensation 
events, payments for changes in law and benchmarking or market testing of charges 
relating to certain subcontractor services against market rates [URL 17] pp.22. 
 
3.3.2.2 Regulation 40 
Within the Capital Finance Regulations, the regulation 40 is seen as the most important 
regulation for local authority PFI schemes. Until 31
st March, 2000, regulation 40 was 
known as ‘Contract Structure Test’. With effect from 1
st April, 2000, regulation 40 was 
replaced in its entirety. The case studies included here have been signed before 31
st 
March, 2000. On account of their relevance to the case studies, the Contract Structure 
Test will be explained below. The new test, being effective from 1
st April, 2000, will be 
described subsequently. 
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The Contract Structure Test 
Provided that the PFI scheme was in compliance with regulation 16 and was value for 
money, the Contract Structure Test had to be passed in order not to provide credit cover 
for the transaction, “which would otherwise be required for a credit arrangement under 
sections 48 to 50” [URL 19] p.2 of the Local Government and Housing Act 1989. It is 
important to note, that unlike in other parts of the public sector, the test had never any 
direct significance on the determination of the accounting treatment of local authorities 
PFI schemes. This test was effectively a proxy for measuring the level of risk transfer in 
a local authority PFT and could not say anything about whether a PFI scheme was off or 
on the public sector Balance Sheet. In practice, the Contract Structure Test meant that 
the minimum payment to the contractor does not exceed 80% of the estimated NPV 
assuming the poorest level of performance and the minimum level of asset usage being 
accepted without having a breach of the contract agreement. In other words, at least 
20% of the fee payable to the private contractor is calculated according to measures of 
performance or usage and that those 20% are the minimum level of risk transfer that 
must be achieved in circumstances that fall short to the termination of the contract. 
 
The New Test and Accounting for PFI 
In other parts of the public sector, the minimum level of risk transfer in a PFT is 
assessed through the application of an accounting test. Sufficient level of risk transfer 
means that the transaction is judged to be off the public sector Balance Sheet. The test 
applied is set out in Financial Reporting Standard 5 (FRS5). The accounting for local 
authority PFT has always been in accordance with the CIPFA ‘Statement of 
Recommended Practice’ or SORP. Since the update of SORP, considering the ASB 
Application Note Financial Reporting Standard 5 ‘Reporting the Substance of 
Transactions – Accounting for PFI Transactions’, local authorities have been required to 
account for their PFTs in accordance with the requirements of FRS5. To bring local 
government into line with other parts of the public sector, the DETR has changed the 
risk transfer test in regulation 40 to incorporate the requirements of FRS5. The new 
regulation 40 is found in full length in the Appendix B. 
 
Only balance sheet entries, directly relating to assets which are subject of the PFT as 
defined under regulation 16, are considered in the new test. With the test, no credit 
cover will be required where there is no increase in any amounts on the authority’s 
balance sheet in respect of the assets provided, constructed or improved under the 
contract. The two exceptions where balance sheet increases are ignored for this purpose 
are [URL 19] p.3: 
(a) where the authority transfers an asset to the PFI contractor in return for reduced 
fees; and 
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(b) where an asset provided under the PFI contract is transferred into the ownership of 
the authority at the end of the contract. 
 
The general expectation of a PFI deal is that it provides best value for money by 
transferring a sufficient level of risk to the private sector. Regulation 40 is complying 
with that expectation in that it requires the local authority to structure deals such that a 
sufficient balance of risk are transferred to the contractor to enable the transaction to be 
judged off the local authority's balance sheet. To determine which of the two parties has 
an asset of the property will depend upon whether it has access to the benefits of the 
property and exposure to the associated risk which is being quantifiable. The factors of 
risk being capable for a quantitative analysis are: “demand risk, the presence of any 
third party revenues, design risk, penalties for under-performance or non-availability, 
potential changes in relevant costs, obsolescence and residual value risk” [URL 17] 
p.28. Because construction risk does not have an impact during the operational life of 
the project, it is excluded from that analysis. Almost all local authorities require central 
government support
9 to go ahead with their PFI schemes. Passing this test is an essential 
prerequisite for application of that central government support. In the following chapter, 
the process for a PFI credit approval and the calculation of the PFI credit will be 
explained briefly. 
 
3.4  Revenue Support for PFI Projects 
3.4.1 The Approval Process for PFI Credits 
When undertaking a PFI scheme it is important for the local authority and the contractor 
alike to know that the local authority has the financial means to procure such a project 
over its lifetime. Therefore, a new framework had been established in November 1997 
to ensure that PFI projects going to OJEC notice (unless the project value is below the 
thresholds set by the regulations)
10 are financially secured. This included the creation of 
the Project Review Group (PRG). The PRG oversees the approval process and is 
responsible for endorsing all local authority PFI projects in England, which will receive 
revenue support from central government. All meetings of the PRG are attended by the 
4P’s. The sum of additional revenue support to local government the PRG can endorse 
in any year is set by the Treasury Ministers, and is then distributed among the various 
departments
11. That creates a competitive environment among the local authorities, 
                                                 
9 Also known as PFI credit. 
10 The current threshold (from 1 January 2000 to 31 December 2001) is 5million Euros for works 
contracts and 200,000 Euros for services contracts awarded by central government (Hickmann 2000, p. 
9). 
11 Departments are for example DTLR, DFES, DoH and Home Office  
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applying for an additional revenue support for their PFI schemes. The process between 
project identification and procurement for a local authority project seeking revenue 
support, outlined by Blackwell (2000, p.5) is as follows: 
1.  Identify the need for the project and justify the business need. 
2.  Consider the funding options available. 
3.  Establish the necessary level of support from elected members or others. 
4.  Will PFI be likely to deliver ‘value for money’ or ‘best value’? 
5.  Appoint professional advisers for taking advice. 
6.  Early discussions with the relevant government department. 
7.  Drafting of the outline business case with advisory input. 
8.  Secure commitment from elected members or decision makers. 
9.  Submission of the project to the relevant government department. 
10. The responsible department evaluates the project against published criteria. 
11. Projects endorsed by the department are submitted to PRG
12. 
12. The OGC
13 will scrutinise the project. 
13. Endorsement by PRG. 
14. Procurement may commence with a notice in the OJEC. 
 
The aim of such a process is for local authorities to produce the best business case 
possible and to consider the departmental criteria for favouring special projects, in order 
to be successful against others in the direct competition for the limited additional 
revenue support.  
 
PFI schemes, which do not pass the Regulation 40 test but show value for money, can 
still be put forward for supplementary credit approvals. For self-financing PFI schemes, 
local authorities do not apply for an additional revenue support from central 
government, because the costs will be met from revenues generated by the project itself 
or perhaps from other resources of the authority. Those projects do not require the 
agreement of the government and do not need to be brought to their attention. From the 
government’s point of view, local authorities should explore the scope for self-financing 
schemes wherever possible. However, local authorities always try to obtain as much 
grant money from central government as possible. So, even if they can procure the 
                                                 
12 The issues the PRG will consider when looking at a project can be found at  .  [URL 20]
13 The OGC has taken over the role as a chair of the PRG from the TTF; Partnerships UK will only be 
involved in the appraisal of PRG projects where there is clearly no conflict of interest with its role in 
co-sponsoring some local authority projects. 
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 project without a PFI credit, they will nearly always apply for such a credit, because 
this is an additional grant from central government apart from the RSG. 
 
3.4.2  The Calculation of the PFI Credit 
The PFI credit is calculated in the same way as it is for traditionally procured capital 
schemes. That means it will be paid over a large number of years with the annual 
amount received steadily declining. Generally, the PFI credit is based on the whole life 
costs of the project in NPV terms. But the whole life costs include components 
reflecting both the contractor’s revenue and capital costs. The PFI revenue support has 
to be restricted solely to the capital component of the overall costs in order to avoid 
double counting, because the part relating to revenue cost is assumed to be already 
catered for in the relevant SSA service element. The two methods for adjustment 
avoiding double-counting are: 
 
1. The Revenue Abatement Method 
The 4P’s state that the adjustment is achieved by “abating the estimated whole life 
costs of the project (i.e. the NPV of the unitary charge) by a pre-determined 
percentage that is set by the DETR at a level that should reflect the ‘revenue’ 
element of the scheme.” [URL 21] p. 6. The present figure for abatement of new 
buildings is 30% of the whole life costs. For replacement buildings, the initial cost 
of the project is currently reduced by 30%, or, if higher, by the capitalised average 
annual expenditure on the old building. 
 
2. The Capital Value Method 
With this method, local authorities should estimate the capital value of the scheme, 
which is the net present value of all capital expenditure by the contractor over the 
whole period of the contract. The discount rate for calculating the NPV for PFI 
schemes reaching signature in 2000/2001 was 7.9%
14. More detailed information on 
departmental PFI prioritisation criteria and on the calculation of the PFI credit can 
be found in [URL 21] and [URL 22]. 
                                                 
14 That discount rate is only used for calculation of the discount rate of the PFI credit. For project 
appraisal and the assessment of value for money (PSC), local authorities still need to use the Treasury 
rate published in the Green Book, which is 6%. 
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4  The Role of Small and Medium Sized Enterprises 
4.1  Definition of Small and Medium Enterprises 
Anybody using data series from SME statistics must be careful when comparing such 
data. This is due to the fact that there is no single definition for SME’s. There are two 
definitions of SME’s in the UK, which are broadly used. These are: 
 
The Companies Act 
Section 248 of the Act of 1985 includes the definition of a small or medium sized 
company. 
Criterion  Small Company  Medium Company 
Turnover  Max £2.8million  Max £11.2million 
Balance Sheet  Max £1.4million  Max £5.6million 
Employees  50 250 
Table 4: Companies Act Criteria 
 
A company qualifies as small or medium if it meets two of the above three criteria in 
any year, see Table 4. 
 
European Commission 
Criterion  Small Company  Medium Company 
Turnover  Max 7million Euro  Max 40million Euro 
Balance Sheet  Max 5million Euro  Max 27million Euro 
Employees  Max 49  Max 249 
Independence criterion
(a)  25% 25% 
(a) The independence criterion refers to the maximum percentage that may be 
owned by one, or jointly owned by several, enterprises not satisfying the same 
criteria. 
Table 5: European Commission Criteria 
 
To qualify as a SME, both the employee and the independence criteria must be satisfied 
and either the turnover or the balance sheet total criteria. A large firm is any not 
satisfying the above criteria. A micro firm is defined any firm which has not more than 
nine employees [URL 23]. 
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4.2 SME  Statistics 
The definition criterion for the size of the company within all statistical data represented 
here was solely based on the number of employees in the firm. 
 
Based on the data of the year 2000, only 25,000 were medium sized enterprises and less 
than 7,000 were large ones out of the entire business population of 3.7 million 
enterprises. Small businesses, including those without employees, accounted for over 
99% of businesses, 44% of non-government employment and 37% of turnover. In 
contrast, the 7,000 largest businesses accounted for 45% of non-government 











































































































































































































































































Turnover £2,033,728 million Turnover £127,033 million
  All Industries  Construction Industry 
Figure 2: Business Share according to Company Size by Percentage [URL 24] 
 
With focus on the construction sector, small enterprises form a substantial proportion of 
the UK construction industry, with some 90% of companies employing less than ten 
staff. Compared to other business sectors, the construction sector has far more people 
employed in the numerous small companies with a turnover share of 59%. That figure 
shows that much of the workload is done by small companies. It is also interesting to 
see how the relationship between turnover and number of employees based on company 
size is changing. In the construction sector that figure is increasing faster than for the 
whole business sector, see Figure 2. This phenomenon may be explained by the fact that 
larger construction companies carry out less work with a directly employed workforce 
compared to small ones. Most of a large contract is passed on to smaller subcontractors 
by the large constructor. Compared to other industries, it seems that economies of scale 
do not play such a significant role in the construction sector. 
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4.3  Problems faced by SME’s in Construction 
Small and large construction firms are fundamentally different. Small firms operate in 
close, localised business networks and are characterised by short-term strategic horizons 
and simple, relatively static organisational capabilities. Large firms operate in complex, 
multiple business and institutional networks and are characterised by long term strategic 
horizons and complex, dynamic organisational capabilities. Therefore small 
construction companies will sometimes face other challenges and problems than large 





































































































































































































































































Figure 3: The most important problems facing small firms (March 2001), [URL 25] p.20 
 
The importance of these problems can be applied to the construction sector. Bearing in 
mind the relationship between employees and turnover from chapter 4.2 and looking at 
Figure 3, it becomes obvious that neither higher profit margins nor economies of scale 
have the biggest influence on that figure in the construction sector. Thus, it is probably 
the low turnover and the rate of capacity utilisation that have the highest impact on it. In 
the construction sector the low turnover might be explained by the small business 
criteria mentioned above and the recession in the early nineties when the large 
companies were encroaching upon the territory of the smaller contractors [URL 26]. 
 
Another important issue for small companies is the Cash Flow/Debtor relation that 
includes late payments. That issue is more present in the construction sector than in any 
other industry. Small construction firms rely heavily on the income stream of current 
projects. A lack of payments can therefore create huge gaps within the working capital 
base of small constructors. In order to improve the situation of smaller constructors, the 
‘late payment of Commercial Debts Act 1998’ was introduced. It allows for any 
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commercial business to pursue any other business for interest and debts [URL 27]. The 
interest rate is set at 8% over LIBOR. Another way out of this problem, but seldom used 
by SME’s, is factoring. This is due to the high cost to small firms created by the 
provision of credits to enterprises awaiting payments, along with the service of 
collecting payments on the enterprises’ behalf. 
 
Looking at the funding of SME’s by banks including interest payments, the 
Cruickshank report [URL 28] p.3 points out that there is no effective competition in the 
UK banking sector. SME’s are not offered fair terms and conditions. A few large banks 
in the UK dominate the market for SME financing and their service is unsatisfactory. 
The four
15 big banks have a market share of 83% among SME’s. Due to this complex 
monopoly structure, those banks generate huge profits on the back of SME’s by 
providing financial services to them. Because of the current structure, it is only possible 
for new banks to enter the SME market and create more competition if the government 
intervenes. 
 
4.4  Strategies for Construction SME’s in the PFI Market 
When looking for a strategy in the PFI market, it is essential to know that there are 
fundamental issues which significantly distinguish PFI from normal public sector 
construction, as shown in Table 6 on page 27. 
 
Therefore, new market opportunities created by PFI need to be tempered by the 
ramifications of the wrong type of involvement. It is reasonable to assume that most 
constructors would initially be interested because of the opportunity to increase their 
normal business. That objective would probably result in simply adding more 
construction work to the existing portfolio, but it would not be sufficient for a long-term 
investment in PFI. Given the fact not to be a consortium leader, the long-term 
involvement would at least require investment of equity, which may take years to yield 
a return. The Construction Industry Council (1998, p.19) points out that "there is a 
definite possibility that there will be a market in the sale and purchase of equity in 
established projects". But bearing in mind, that the transaction cost will increase in 
relation to a decrease in project size it is, therefore, doubtful that this will work for 
smaller PFI schemes. 
 
                                                 
15 The four banks are Barclays, HSBC, Lloyds TSB and Nat West 
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Key differences between traditional public sector procurement and PFI 
Area of consideration  Characteristics of traditional 
public sector procurement 
(generalised) 
Characteristics of the PFI 
(generalised) 
Duration of private sector 
involvement in the project 
Until construction of the facility 
is complete 
Normally for at least 25 years 
for construction-related PFI 
projects 
Specific company involvement  Appointed by the public client 
on an individual basis for the 
supply of specific skills 
Part of a consortium with the 
necessary skills or taking a 
contracting role 
Private sector risks  Specific to the area of 
involvement and limited to 
defect liabilities 
Wide ranging and long term 
Remuneration  Lump sum or percentage fee  Annualised payment 
Opportunity for private sector 
innovations 
Limited Considerable 
Key financial considerations for 
the private sector company 
Maintaining a positive cash flow 
and margins 
Having an adequate asset base 
and debt facility 
Attitude required of the private 
sector from the public sector 
Reactive Proactive 
Table 6: Traditional Procurement versus PFI, Construction Industry Council 1998, p.10 
 
The following paragraphs explain different possible roles for smaller construction 
companies within the PFI market, which can be considered when looking for a company 
strategy. 
 
4.4.1  The Constructor as Consortium Leader and Operator 
The constructor can respond to a PFI project by forming the bidding firm. It is well 
known that the bid for a PFI project is a complex and lengthy process. It requires 
technical, legal and financial expertise. Therefore it is initially beyond the scope of any 
single company to provide all the necessary skills, thus requiring the input of specialist 
advisors and consultants. The employment of some specialists can be achieved using a 
success fee, but other consultation fees will have to be paid regardless of success. For 
smaller construction companies, that kind of involvement only makes sense, if there are 
prospects of establishing competitive advantage in a niche by repeated bidding and 
innovation or long-term interests in the project, such as facility management, and that 
the type of project would be straightforward construction with simple operating 
requirements. A small constructor should therefore choose a strategy which focuses on a 
special kind of PFI project, such as schools or small serviced offices. 
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Another hurdle for smaller constructors is the perception of the local authorities of the 
full range of skills that are expected from the private sector. So it is important that the 
local authority as client has confidence in what the consortium offers. 
 
A further important issue for the constructor is the funding of the project. Because of a 
lack of capital resources and liquidity, small constructors seek to contribute as little 
equity as possible. The remaining money is usually provided through external debt 
financing by banks. The current minimum amount of equity accepted by banks is about 
5% to 15% of the capital value for the project. It is very common that single companies 
bidding for a PFI project use a special purpose vehicle to undertake the PFI project, so 
as to arrange the financing of the project on a limited or non-recourse basis. Limited 
recourse finance means thereby that the parent company will be financially liable to a 
certain extent for the defaults of the special purpose vehicle. This liability is often 
indemnified by guarantees from the parent company to the lender, such as parent 
guarantees for the construction phase of a project. 
 
Apart from private sector concerns at entering the PFI market as a consortium leader 
and operator there are actions by government which will discriminate SME’s when 
bidding for PFI projects in the future. The NHS Estates announced under its 'Procure 21' 
route, that all PFI schemes worth between £1 million and £20 million will be bundled 
together and shared among larger contractors. Thus, the following quote is 
understandable, where "Procure 21 has been criticised by small builders, who wanted 
the threshold raised to £4 million" [URL 29]. Smaller firms will only be able to tender 
for subcontracting work.  
 
4.4.2  The Constructor as a Partner in a Joint Venture 
It is possible that a construction company forms a consortium together with an operator 
sharing the profits between them. That type of arrangement combines the various skills 
of those experts in the construction sector with those experts in the facility management 
sector. This has been a very popular and successful route of tendering for PFI contracts. 
It enables both parties to bid together for more complex projects, ending up with more 
potential projects they can bid for. That approach is especially interesting for smaller 
construction firms, which are short of cash reserves or liquidity. For those there is a 
chance of putting in 'sweat equity', i.e. accepting a shareholding in lieu of payment for 
development work. Either contributing equity in form of cash payment or 'sweat equity' 
will add value to the project. 
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When establishing a joint venture, the parties have to consider the moral hazard problem 
and the cost of due diligence because of different company cultures and expectations. 
Those issues can produce a result where a joint venture is just doomed to fail. 
Therefore, it can be assumed that only long-term partnerships will have a chance of 
survival and secure a successful business in the established PFI market. 
 
 
4.4.3  The Constructor as Construction Contractor 
The third option as construction contractor appears to be the most traditional role that a 
constructor can take, by providing construction work in return for reimbursement. It is 
possible that the concessionaire may want to bundle all construction activities into a 
construction package and get construction firms to tender for this design and build 
package. Where the concessionaire contains construction skills, there may be direct 
management of the construction activities. It is quite common for the constructor as 
construction contractor to be paid in stages out of finance raised by the concessionaire 
as work progresses. 
 
The risk associated with construction activities, particularly with the risk of 
construction-cost increase and late delivery of the completed construction, is usually 
transferred from the public sector to the concessionaire. The concessionaire has to 
decide on how much of that risk will be passed on to the construction contractor. On the 
one hand, the concessionaire absorbs all the risk and employs the construction company 
under traditional forms of contract, with all the associated risks of delays and claims. 
On the other hand, the concessionaire is passing on all the risk to the constructor, 
procuring construction work under a turnkey package with a guaranteed maximum price 
and a penalty for late delivery or any failings of the completed facility over a 
predetermined liability period. This implies that the constructor has to carefully 
consider the risk he is taking on when signing a contract with the concessionaire. 
 
4.4.4  SME’s form Consortia 
In recent times, local authorities have started to bundle small PFI scheme into large 
packages in order to achieve better value for money. That has made the PFI packages 
too big for smaller contractors to bid for as a consortium leader or to take on the role as 
a construction contractor. However, smaller construction companies see themselves as 
independent companies and are not willing to only work as subcontractors. Therefore, 
small builders have begun to pool their resources to form consortia and looser joint-
venture arrangements. This movement can be seen as a step to overcome the hurdles of 
scarce resources and finance in order to be in a better position when bid for a bigger PFI 
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contract. A prominent example for such a consortia, examined by Cavill [URL 30], is 
'Portsmouth's 49-strong Key Consortia' which is made up of 49 companies with 
architects, small builders, quantity surveyors, electricians and plumbers each having 3 
to 5 staff. The maximum contract value they will bid for is £5 million. It must be said, 
that this contract value is at the bottom end for the size of PFI contracts. A medium 
sized construction company can easily bid for such a project as a single company 
having the necessary skills or forming a joint venture with an operator as mentioned 
above. Again, the perception of the local authority for selecting a private partner will 
prevent them in most cases to deal with a consortia consisting of 49 small companies. 
They do not want to take the high risk of testing such a management structure. 
Internally, the consortium has to deal with issues such as: how to spread the risk among 
members, and how to split profits and losses. One can only conclude that the formation 
of consortia with many small companies with too few staff provides very little ground 
to build upon and the opportunities to become involved in 'bigger' contracts will be 
quite limited. 
 
5. Case  Studies 
5.1  Case Study Approach 
Having examined different strategies for SME’s, it is a main objective of carrying out 
the case studies to investigate whether SME’s really can become involved in PFI 
projects as equal partners in practice, and not merely as a subcontractor. 
 
Given the fact that SME’s are restricted by the size and the supply of resources, the 
main criteria for selecting the projects has been their low net present value. Other 
selection criteria were: 
•  The project must be up and running and not be in the procurement process, 
because the experiences of the private partner's involvement with regards to 
opportunities and problems occurring are essential for any recommendations 
that may be made. 
•  The accessibility to data and information. 
•  The PFI project had to include the construction of a public building. 
 
The search for relevant projects matching the above criteria was difficult, since only a 
handful of small PFI projects in local government have been in operation to date. The 
use of internet databases
16, which contained the status, the value and the kind of PFI 
project, facilitated the search by far. It must be said, that the database of the 4P’s 
                                                 
16 For relevant internet databases see  ,   or  .  [URL 8] [URL 31] [URL 32]
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contains information on a project's capital value, as provided by a local authority, which 
is contradictory to the real figures. According to the 4P’s, there appears to be a 
misunderstanding by some local authorities of the meaning of the term capital value. 
For clarification, the capital value of a PFI project is the value of its construction cost 
including the costs for furniture, fittings and equipment, which is also known as FFE. 
 
The relevant information for the case studies has been gathered through structured 
interviews with the relevant parties to a project and by the provision of additional 
material by those interview partners. 
 
5.2  Case Study 1 – Victoria Dock Primary School 
5.2.1 Introduction 
This case study is about the first school in England provided under the Private Finance 
Initiative, examining the arrangements between Hull City Council and Victoria Dock 
Primary School Company Ltd. 
 
According to the development of the population in the area, the school was separated 
into three different phases. Phase 1 comprised a 60 places primary school with a 26 
places nursery class including administration areas, two classrooms, a playground and 
sportsfield. Phase 2 extended the capacity to 120 pupils by adding on two more 
classrooms and a bigger staff room. Having finished phase 1, the school opened in 
January 1999. Phase 2 became operational 1 year later. The school will reach its final 
size after phase 3 by adding on another two classrooms and providing space for 240 
pupils. Phase 3 is planned to be open sometime in 2003. 
A net present value of £2.7 million and a capital value of £1.5 million for phase 1 show 
how small and unique the project is compared to other school PFI schemes. 
 
5.2.2  The Procurement Process 
5.2.2.1 Background Information 
The redevelopment of the industrial area "The Docklands" into an urban village in 
Kingston upon Hull in the early nineties led to the need of a primary school as an 
integral part of that area in order to attract new tenants and to promote house sales. 
 
Actually, there was no other option than building a new school. When examining the 
option of a new school in 1996, it became clear, that there was no sufficient borrowing 
power by the Hull Education Authority to fund the school in a traditional way. During 
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that time, the authority came across the DfEE road show promoting PFI in education. 
So, PFI became the only option for procuring the needed school. 
 
Approaching this new concept of procurement, the education authority contacted the 
PFI department of the DfEE with the result, that they were not supporting the project as 
it was too small. It can only be assumed that this has been the reason why the Victoria 
Dock Primary School project did not become a pathfinder scheme. However, despite 
this the Hull education authority continued with this option and finally overtook all 
other pathfinder schemes in the educational sector, which showed that they were a true 
pilot scheme, acting in a loose framework of regulations. 
 
A consequence of this pilot status the procurement process was structured more simply 
than is the case with current schemes. For example, no outline business case had been 
produced to obtain the notional credit approval, as no framework for the notional credit 
approval existed with regards to PFI schemes in education at that point in time. 
 
5.2.2.2 Project Management 
Hull education authority started off with a very small team doing the PFI work beside 
their usual work. Due to the lack of knowledge concerning PFI deals, the education 
authority decided to appoint external advisers for the financial and legal aspects of the 
project. The authority received a fixed sum from the government as a grant for external 
advisor fees, which finally covered about 75% of the overall fees. Eversheds were 
chosen to work out the legal aspects of the deal. For the financial part of the project the 
authority selected Deloittes & Touch on the basis that they were also involved in the 
Dorset school project and that they had some experience from other PFI deals. Deloittes 
also developed the project timetable, see Table 7. Eversheds was taken on board very 
early in the process, as there was no model contract and they had to invent an 
appropriate one. This created unanticipated enormous costs on the legal side. 
 
The total time from OJEC notice to unconditional signing, as shown in Table 7, was 18 
months. The delay of 8 months was mainly caused by the negotiations with the 
preferred bidder, which took much longer than planned. This was offset by the special 
single team structure of the special purpose vehicle, which made it possible to shorten 
the construction period by 3 months. 
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Task  Planned  Occurred 
OJEC notice  January 1997  January 1997 
Sending out the questionnaire and 
the marketing brief 
March 1997  March 1997 
Distribution of ITN to shortlisted 
Bidders 
11 April 1997  11 April 1997 
Briefing Day for Bidders  30 April 1997  30 April 1997 
Bidders – Deadlines for questions 
to be submitted by 
20 June 1997  20 June 1997 
Submission of bids  04 July 1997  04 July 1997 
Preferred Bidder and Reserve 
Bidder selected 
15 August 1997  September 1997 
Unconditional signing  30 October 1997  02 July 1998 
Ground Break  January 1998  August 1998 
School occupation  September 1998  January 1999 
Table 7: Project Timetable for Victoria Dock Primary School 
 
5.2.2.3 From OJEC Notice to Bidder Selection 
The procurement process began in January 1997 with the project notice in the OJEC. 
Meanwhile the authority produced a marketing brief, describing the project and the 
form of procurement in more detail, and a preliminary questionnaire. Those documents 
were sent out to the 12 companies expressing their interest in the project. Only half of 
the questionnaires were returned. Due to the small number of strongly interested 
companies, the authority did not do a further shortlisting and issued the ITN to all of 
them. The ITN had been quite detailed and included the following important parts: 
•  Instructions to negotiate: Including information about the procurement 
process, compulsory items that had to be considered or included in the bid 
and the evaluation criteria for selecting the preferred bidder. 
•  Building Design Output Specification: This document laid down the design 
requirements for school buildings and school grounds accommodation with 
regards to the school management and its relevant policies, and the 
operational and capacity requirements. 
•  Building Service Output Specification: This comprised all the performance 
requirements and quality standards for the estates and management service; 
catering services (not included in the current contract); care-taking, security 
and safety services; and the equipment provision and maintenance services. 
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The bidders consisted of four big companies, a design company and the Sewell Group. 
The ITN were returned at beginning of July and the authority conducted some further 
interviews with the bidders. The selection criteria for the preferred bidder were 
separated into legal, financial and technical aspects all equally weighted. An important 
point, which the authority included in their decision, was that they asked themselves 
with whom they could work together for 25 years on a partnership basis without 
ongoing disputes. The authority did not have a best and final offer. They selected a 
preferred bidder and a reserve bidder in September 1997. The Sewell Group was 
awarded preferred bidder status. It was good practise to keep the reserve bidder 
involved during the negotiation process, but as a consequence of the loose and 
undefined negotiation process, which caused a lot of problems, the reserve bidder was 
kept very much in the background. Not having a best and final offer may have shortened 
the selection process, but it also took some element of competition out of the bidding 
process and as a result it perhaps did not achieve the best value for money deal possible. 
 
5.2.2.4 Problems during the Negotiation Phase 
The delay in reaching financial closure implies that not everything was going smoothly 
during the negotiation phase. But compared to other projects, the negotiation process 
was quite short. It is easy to understand that it was difficult to agree on a contract which 
had never been used before in the school sector. All aspects had to be sorted out on first 
principles with the help of advisers, who themselves had no experience of PFI projects 
in the educational sector. The following issues caused a delay in the negotiation 
process: 
•  The discussion on the extent of risk transfer in the light of the different 
attitude to risk by the parties to the contract (see 5.2.3.6). 
•  The representatives from the education authority at the negotiation table did 
not have the full authority to agree on certain topics. 
•  The financier joined the negotiations too late and made decisions which had 
to be revised in order to have the deal financed. 
•  The bank originally financing the deal backed out within weeks of contract 
signature. Sewell had to look for a new bank. 
•  Non-stakeholders, such as Sewell's and the local authority's financial and 
legal advisers, were driving the process. They were not motivated to 
conclude the deal in good time, because they were paid on time spent rather 
than on a fixed sum. 
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5.2.2.5 Project Approval 
The education authority produced a public sector comparator and a value for money 
assessment. When the project passed the contract structure test, the education authority 
was ready to apply for the PFI credit amounting to £1.5 million. The PRG did not exist 
at that point of time. The whole project was scrutinised by the project board of the 
Treasury, based on the two key documents which had been submitted and finally 
approved. 
 
5.2.3 The  Contract 
5.2.3.1 The Contract Structure 









































Figure 4: Contract Structure for Victoria Dock Primary School 
 
5.2.3.2 The Consortium Leader Perspective 
The SPV is a wholly owned subsidiary of the Sewell Group. Almost everything is 
delivered by Sewell. That situation refers back to the strategy of being the consortium 
leader and operator. But, how is a medium sized construction enterprise able to deliver 
everything from design to facilities management, which, after all, is a complex process 
requiring different skills. 
 
The Sewell Group is an old family business, which worked exclusively as a 
construction contracting company up to the late 80's. The UK recession in the early 90's 
forced Sewell into a position where it had to think about new business opportunities. On 
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the one hand, Sewell went for a vertical integration strategy establishing a design and 
development department and a facility management wing within their company. On the 
other hand, Sewell became a retailer for petrol. This structure remained unchanged until 
today. Sewell has an actual turnover of £30 million a year, half of it is in retail, £12 
million come from the construction side and the remaining £3million are generated by 
the facilities management sector. It employs about 200 people, around 80 in the retail 
business and 120 in the remaining departments. 
 
Especially the knowledge and skills gained from the vertical integration some years 
before allowed the Sewell Group to take up the bidder role. Delivering the whole 
process as a single team gave the company several advantages: 
•  Fewer disputes had to be resolved during negotiations compared to a project 
team consisting of several partners, thereby reducing the transaction and bidding 
cost for the project. 
•  No disputes about passing on risks to subcontractors; 
•  Reducing the construction period by three months from tightening up the 
process by diminishing the interface problems. 
•  Retaining all profit opportunities, i.e. from the D&B contract, the FM contract 
and the return on equity funding. 
 
Being Quality Assured to ISO 9002 and BS 5750 was another factor helping the 
Sewell Group to be selected as preferred bidder. 
 
5.2.3.3 Contract Agreement and Service Specification 
It is a 25 years DBFO contract between Hull education authority and the private 
sector partner. Both parties decided that they were not aiming for dual usage in 
order to generate third party income. The decision was based on the limited use of 
the facilities and the exposure to higher risk of the private partner in terms of 
maintenance, security, building standards and risk of vandalism. 
 
The service agreement includes ground maintenance, window cleaning, waste 
disposal, security, care-taking, active maintenance, cleaning and plant maintenance 
and provision of IT hardware. The private sector does not provide school meals, 
although a fully equipped kitchen is in place. It is still cheaper for the education 
authority to provide the meals from outside. The teaching service is also provided by 
the public body. One of the effects of the service agreement is to allow for the 
teachers to concentrate on their core activities. 
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5.2.3.4 Performance Standards and Payment Mechanism 
The service has to comply with the agreed service standards. There is a walk around 
every day with a checklist completed by teaching staff. Urgent items are reported 
immediately to the caretaker from Sewells. 
 
The payment of the unitary charge is separated into availability and performance 
criteria. The payment structure satisfies the Contract Structure Test, as around 30% 
of the unitary charge is variable. There is a system in place with penalty points for 
defaults in major and minor areas, which can affect the income stream. In major 
areas, as for example the classrooms, Sewells can also be charged for any 
unavailability. But it must be said, that no deduction of the unitary charge has 
occurred so far. A benchmarking system in certain areas including the floor area, 
energy usage and others with other schools ensures that the project will be working 
under a best value regime in the future. 
 
5.2.3.5 Project Funding 
The project finance is split into debt finance and equity funding. The debt finance, 
provided by the Bank of Scotland, accounts for 90% of the total funds required. The 
remaining 10% are the minimum amount the bank allowed Sewells to contribute as 
equity funding. As mentioned before, the HSBC was set to fund the project but 
withdrew suddenly shortly before contract signature. Sewell had to look for a new 
bank and found a partner in the Bank of Scotland. The bank was worried when 
Sewell re-let the FM function and about the repayment of the debt. The duration for 
the finance to be repaid is only 10 years. The Sewell Group decided to take the 
market risk and let the interest rate be variable. This proved to be the right decision 
until now, since the interest rate in the financial model is set at 10.3% and Sewell 
bought in at a range of 8 to 9% the previous years. Originally, the interest rate was 
set at 2.5% above LIBOR. But the rate finally came down to 1.75%, firstly, because 
Sewell could tie phases 1 and 2 together into a bigger package and secondly, since 
the risk decreased substantially once the school was up and running. So, the bank 
and Sewells agreed on a parent company guarantee from the Sewell Group for the 
construction phase. The non-recourse financing situation, a characteristic of project 
financing, was thereby transferred to a limited-recourse finance situation. The parent 
company guarantee expired in March 1999, two months after the school went into 
operation. 
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5.2.3.6 Risk Allocation 
It was not easy for the project parties to identify and quantify all relevant risks which 
were of concern to the scheme, as there was no risk transfer model in place as it does 
today. So, 38 risks were listed in a risk matrix, from which 36 risks were passed on to 
the Sewell Group. Only two risks remained with the education authority. Those were 
changes in educational legislation and health legislation. Because Sewells subcontracted 
the mechanical & electrical work including maintenance for 10 years, it could pass that 
particular risk on the subcontractor. Another aspect, which also can be regarded as a 
risk, is the increase in business rates. If this should happen the education authority will 
provide the school with the additional amount as part of their devolved budget. 
 
5.2.4  Positive Factors and Innovations 
Schools by their nature, whether they are of small or big size, have to comply with a 
whole range of regulations according to standards listed in the ITN, see 5.2.2.3. This 
made it very difficult for Sewells to introduce any innovation to the fabric of the 
building. A main advantage of the PFI option has been the whole-life-costing approach. 
As a result of this Sewells installed additional security in the roof and placed shutters on 
the windows in order to reduce costs, which have come as a result of vandalism and 
broken windows at times when the school is unattended. It also provides a higher than 
required safety standard for the people accommodated at the school. The school also 
receives a dividend payback, which is half the amount exceeding the calculated profit 
stated in the financial model. This agreement transfers the objective of achieving an 
efficient service delivery from the service provider back to the staff working at the 
school. In the first year, £ 5,000 was saved. The money is not paid back in cash. The 
Sewell Group is using this money to create a wildlife biotope project for use as an 
external classroom. The positive relationship between Hull education authority and the 
Sewell Group is further strengthened by having Mr. Paul Sewell sitting as a school 
governor, which benefits both sides. The school can expect a better service since its 
needs a likely to be better understood by having a careful listener and the Sewell Group 
can achieve a better service as it knows what is required of it, avoiding mistakes along 
the way. Summarising, it can be said that the education authority has received its reward 
for having the courage to choose a smaller local contractor, who is an integral part of 
the community. 
 
5.3  Case Study 2 – Stretford Fire Station & Divisional HQ 
5.3.1 Introduction 
The Stretford Fire Station & 'A' Divisional Headquarter is one of the earliest PFI 
projects in England procured by the Greater Manchester Fire & Civil Defence 
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Authority. It was one of seven pathfinder schemes from all fire authorities. The 
premises include a four bay fire station of some 1,153m² and a divisional headquarters 
of 368m² for strategic planning. It is designed to accommodate about 20 firemen and 50 
headquarters staff including visitors. The contract was signed on 4
th December 1998 
with the consortium called pff Stretford Limited, a subsidiary of Carden Croft & Co, for 
a duration of 25 years. The NPV of the overall project is approximately £6.6 million, 
including construction cost of £3.2 million. 
 
The case study looks at the overall agreement of the project and considers the different 
views of the fire authority and the private consortium leader. 
 
5.3.2  The Procurement Process 
5.3.2.1 Background Information 
The increase in commercial activity and the continued redevelopment of the area 
serviced by the old Stretford Fire Station during the mid nineties led to the opinion, that 
a fully operational four bay station was needed in the foreseeable future. The old 
facility, built in 1939, was past its life span in structural and functional terms, and health 
and safety improvements were urgently required in order to remain operational. With 
this in mind, the authority came up with four options to address this situation. These 
options were: 
•  Do-Nothing 
•  Minimum Refurbishment 
•  Major Refurbishment 
•  New Build 
 
The first three options did not sufficiently address the core operational problems 
resulting from the outdated design of the current buildings. With regards to both 
operational requirements and the whole life costs, a complete rebuild of Stretford Fire 
Station & Divisional Headquarters was the preferred option. But an ongoing reduction 
in basic credit approval made it impossible to finance the project out of the fire 
authority's current capital or revenue funding. Therefore the fire authority was willing to 
submit a PFI pathfinder bid when they were encouraged by the Home Office in January 
1997, which was approved in March 1997. As a pathfinder scheme the authority 
received £ 70,000 from the government to pay advisers and consultants. Probably due to 
its size, the Greater Manchester Fire & Civil Defence Authority showed a profound 
knowledge and professionalism in how to approach such a project. While other Fire 
Authorities were waiting for guidance from the government, the Manchester one was 
busy developing the required documents on their own. As a consequence, they sold 
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copies of their outline business case to other local authorities and generated an 
additional income of £12,500. 
 
It is a common feature to build a new fire station on a new site, as the old premises have 
to operate without any downtime until the new one is completed. With the Stretford Fire 
Station this was different. The authority decided to demolish the old fire station and to 
rebuild the new one in the same location. There were two reasons for this decision. 
Firstly, the fire appliances must be assured to reach any point of the area covered by 
Stretford Fire Station within a certain time limit. Therefore, the new station could not be 
situated to far from the old one. Secondly, the ongoing development of this industrial 
area led to an explosion of real estate prices and it became unaffordable for any party to 
acquire a new site.  
 
5.3.2.2 Project Team and Advisers 
The fire authority set up a small core project team comprising four people, who did all 
the work on top of their usual workload. They came from the lead authority, Wigan 
MBC, assisting in legal and financial matters and from the Greater Manchester Fire & 
Civil Defence Authority, who were responsible for technical and operational matters. 
The project leader was Roger McLachrie. The authority thus decided to provide most of 
the professional input by itself, using external advisers only for some additional 
guidance and monitoring of the steps taken by the authority. This meant, that the 
authority did not have to pay too much in fees for external advisors, who had not been 
involved with any PFI deals for a fire authority until then. The fire authority eventually 
selected Secta as financial adviser, who at that point had some experience with PFI 
deals in the health sector. On the technical side they appointed WS Atkins, who had an 
architect with experience in PFI deals. The fire authority also budgeted the cost of the 
internal advisers and totalled an overall cost of £100,000 for both internal and external 
advisers. Approximately £20,000 was paid to Secta and the bill of WS Atkins amounted 
to around £35,000. 
 
Furthermore, the authority put a direct reporting line in place with the project team 
reporting to a project board and the board reporting to a policy standing subcommittee, 
which had the authority to approve. 
 
5.3.2.3 Project Timetable 
The fire authority produced a detailed project management plan, which was kept under 
review throughout the procurement.  Table 8 on page 34 shows a summary of the 
timetable for the procurement process. 
   41 
 
As long as the authority and Carden Croft & Co had the control of the single task, they 
were always in line with the planned timescale. The final negotiations were planned to 
be finalised by July 1998, but were protracted for 18 weeks by the lawyers of the 
authority, Carden Croft & Co and the bank. 
 
Task  Outturn 
Pathfinder Submission  January 1997 
Pathfinder Approval  March 1997 
OJEC Notice  March 1997 
Outline Business Case to HO  June 1997 
Shortlisting Bidders  July 1997 
Distribution of ITN  August 1997 
Receiving Initial Bids  October 1997 
BAFO January  1998 
Selection of Preferred Bidder  February 1998 
Final Committee Approval  July 1998 
Contract signed  December 1998 
Occupation of new site  October 1999 
  Table 8: Project Timetable for Stretford Fire Station 
 
5.2.3.4 Finding the right Partner 
In March 1997, the fire authority published an OJEC notice and subsequently sent out 
49 questionnaire packages to the parties having expressed their interest to the project. 
The authority actually wanted to pre-select six bidders for further interviews but 
received only 6 absolute submissions. Therefore, all were invited for interviews with the 
result that the authority very quickly reduced the number to three bidders. Two of the 
six bidders were the same company but represented by different branches, so that they 
combined their bid. Another one was too weak. The third one pulled out, which was 
Jarvis construction, because the build costs were only about £3 million and they were 
interested only in projects with construction cost from £5 million upwards. 
 
In the meantime, the authority submitted the Outline Business case to the Home Office. 
This document addressed the following points: 
•  Establishment of Service Need 
•  Option Appraisal 
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•  Proposed Procurement 
•  Value For Money & Affordability 
•  Scope of Satisfying the Contract Structure Test 
•  Service Performance Requirements 
•  Timetable 
 
The Outline Business Case was amended by further information and actualised project 
data in June 1998, and was submitted to the Home Office as the Final Business Case for 
final approval. The amendments included the payment mechanism, risk evaluation and 
modelling, financial models for pff Stretford Limited, and a project implementation 
timetable. 
 
A well structured and robust series of interviews were conducted with the three short-
listed bidders within a timeframe of 7 weeks. They had three different meetings, starting 
with technical interviews, continuing with technical and financial interviews and 
concluding with technical, financial and legal interviews. This enabled the parties to 
submit their initial bids only 9 weeks after they had received the ITN. With regards to 
construction, the national guidance specification was used in the ITN. It may be 
criticised that the ITN was not detailed enough in its design specifications for the 
bidding parties. Furthermore, the fire authority was responsible for slightly higher 
bidding cost of the parties, as they let them produce final bids for two different options. 
The first one was the re-development on the existing site and the second one was the 
development based on an unidentified new site. Two of the three bidders were taken to 
BAFO, because one bidder did not meet the affordability criteria set out by the 
authority. The final bids were then evaluated against the following criteria: 
•  Quality of construction and design 
•  Quality of FM proposals 
•  Quality of consortium members 
•  Financial proposals 
•  Compliance with bid documentation 
 
Both bids offered a sound solution, but Carden Croft had the more detailed proposal 
and, almost equally important, showed more openness. This convinced the fire 
authority, since they wanted to go about the project in partnership and did not want to 
be involved in hard negotiations after having selected preferred bidder. Thus, Carden 
Croft advanced to preferred bidder. The open relationship between the fire authority and 
Carden Croft laid the foundation for a smooth negotiation process without any major 
disputes. Only the lawyers delayed the negotiation process significantly, see 5.3.2.3. 
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5.3.2.5 Project Approval 
The project had the advantage of being a pathfinder scheme. This virtually guaranteed it 
with the money being there when it was needed. The PFI credit awarded to the project 
was around £4.7 million, calculated by abating the net present value of the whole life 
cost by 30%, see 3.4.2. However, due to the loose framework for PFI credit approval at 
that point of time, the authority had only an oral confirmation that the credit would be 
awarded by the Home Office. But, the project had to pass the contract structure test and 
had to demonstrate value for money to the authority. The contract structure test was 
passed easily with the variable charge representing more than 20% of the overall unitary 
charge. The main driver, as it should be for making the project affordable, was the 
quantification of retained risks by the fire authority under a traditional option within the 
PSC. One main distinction from other PFI projects was that the fire authority used a 
discount rate of 8.9% instead of the 6% set out in the green book to compare the net 
present values of the PFI option with the PSC, reasoning that the money had to be 
borrowed commercially from the private sector. This assumption does not represent a 
fair approach to the value for money assessment and made it easier for the authority to 
show that the project reached value for money. 
 
5.3.3 The  Contract 
5.3.3.1 The Contract Structure 




































Figure 5: Contract Structure for Stretford Fire Station 
 
Carden Croft set up a SPV only for the purpose of the project called pff Stretford 
Limited, which is a subsidiary of Carden Croft. The SPV used Carden Croft as the 
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contractor for design, architectural design, project management, planning supervisor 
role and facilities management. Snape Ltd was contracted for the construction of the 
building. It is surprising that not only the construction risk but also the design risk was 
passed on to the builder, who did not know with what intention the architect had 
designed specific items. Snape Ltd then employed the mechanical & structural engineer 
Miller Walmsley Partnership, and Shaw Whitmore Fyffe Partnership, for structural 
engineering and drainage design.  
 
5.3.3.2 The Consortium Leader Perspective 
Carden Croft & Co limited was established in 1995 by its two directors Simon Carden 
and David Croft, who, being architects, brought in a profound knowledge for adopting a 
whole life approach to building development. A major goal of the business plan was to 
become involved in PFI not just as designer, but as shareholder and consortium leader. 
The company employs currently around ten technical staff, including architects and 
project managers. The facilities management wing employs another 5 to 6 people and 
was set up for the Stretford Fire Station. Those are basically cleaners, building 
managers and cooks. The company is looking forward to employ a FM manager in the 
future, who will be in charge of increasing the business by looking elsewhere. The 
involvement in PFI helped the company to streamline the up and downs of a small 
architect, who is on the look-out from project to project. In retrospect, the approach of 
designing a building with its whole-life-costs in mind has helped the company 
significantly winning more contracts for its traditional architectural side. As a result of 
winning the Stretford Fire Station project, the company has developed a quality 
management system for the FM service and is now quality assured to ISO 9002. The 
company, together with Snapes Ltd as a joint venture partner, is now also looking at 
bigger PFI projects. Another strength and advantage of Carden Croft is their openness 
in dealings with the client including open book accounting. 
 
Carden Croft appointed their accountants Howsons with the task of financial modelling 
and Property Finance International for negotiating the rates of the bank deal. 
 
5.3.3.3 Contract Agreement and Service Specification 
The fire authority and pff Stretford Limited signed a DBFO deal for 25 years. Both 
parties agreed that the building will transfer to the fire authority free after 25 years, as it 
is only dedicated for fire service. Furthermore, the authority will receive any remaining 
funds of the sinking fund, which are left after the 25 year period. The sinking fund is for 
renewals and repairs and is part of the facilities management charge. The authority has 
to approve any expenditure which is to be taken out of the sinking fund. With the 
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decision to rebuild the fire station at the existing site, Carden Croft had to create a 
temporary fire station on a vacant site, within one mile of the existing site, to ensure that 
fire cover was provided until the new fire station became operational. 
 
Carden Croft as facilities manager is responsible for all non-core operational services. 
These are: 
•  Building & Ground maintenance 
•  Cleaning 
•  Care taking & janitorial services 
•  Vehicle fuel storage 
•  Mechanical & electrical services 
•  Waste management 
•  Security & pass control 
•  Catering 
•  Furniture provision and renewal 
•  Utilities & Laundry 
5.3.3.4 Performance Standards and Payment Mechanism 
The unitary charge to the service provider is separated into a performance based charge 
and a payment for availability. The whole building is subdivided into priority zones, 
which are weighted differently for the purpose of calculating the penalties for any 
availability default. The performance charge is based on the services provided by 
Carden Croft. The penalties for an availability default seem to be more painful than the 
performance indicators. Therefore, Carden Croft has put a contingency plan in place to 
avoid any unavailability wherever possible. For example, if the appliance bay doors fail 
to operate then the manual back doors can be used. In that case a performance default 
occurs, but the availability of the function is secured. Only one small default has been 
reported so far in two years of operation 
 
5.3.3.5 Project Funding 
The construction costs of the project are funded by 90% debt finance and 10% equity 
finance. The British Linen Bank provides the long-term debt, which is to be repaid after 
20 years. Carden Croft and the bank fixed the interest rate as a swap rate at around 7% 
to 8%, since Carden Croft was interested to limit as much risk as possible. The bank 
tried to reduce its risk with loan life cover or debt service reserve cover. This affected 
the working capital base of the SPV and pushed up the cost to the authority. In order to 
keep these increases in cost down to a minimum, Carden Croft kept their return on 
equity with the bank for the first few years and will take it out at a later stage of the 
project. 
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Finally, Carden Croft sold 25% of its equity stake to the bank. The contract provides a 
return on equity of around 15%. 
 
5.3.3.6 Risk Allocation 
A sufficient risk transfer to the private sector partner while considering an efficient risk 
allocation is one of the key features of any PFI contract. For the process of risk 
identification, the authority used the risk register for the health sector comprising 1400 
risks, which was provided by Secta. They then reduced and adapted this list to their 
needs and came up with 160 identifiable risks. Values have been put on each single risk, 
and a quantifiable risk analysis was undertaken by using the Monte Carlo risk 
simulation method. The identified risks can be categorised as follows: 
•  Development and construction risks 
•  Operating risks when the facility is up and running 
•  Obsolescence risks 
•  Regulatory and policy risks 
•  Economic risks 
 
The fire authority transferred most of the risks to the SPV, but retained the following 
risks: 
•  Business rates. 
•  The additional costs for design and construction due to late changes of the 
design caused by the fire authority. In fact, this has happened. The authority 
demanded some very late changes to the training towers, which created an 
extra cost of £17,000. 
•  Fire service policy changes to the functional content before the facility was 
commissioned. 
•  Surge in operational requirements due to local or national disaster. 
•  Change in size of fire appliances in the future. 
•  Change in regulations and policies considering design, government structure 
and authority funding (SSA), law specific to fire service. 
•  Variation on interest rates caused by the authority delaying financial closure. 
•  Force majeur. 
•  Obstruction by the authority, that increases the costs to the SPV. 
•  Early termination by the authority not in accordance with contract 
agreements. 
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Carden Croft attempted to transfer as much risk as possible or reduce the financial 
implications by means of carrying out their own risk analysis, covering the risk by 
insurance or developing alternative contingency planning. 
 
5.3.4  Ideas and Innovations 
Carden Croft as architects have come up with a number of ideas with regards to the 
whole life cycle concept of PFI. They designed open plan offices, which would need 
less space and thereby decrease the construction and operational costs. But 
unfortunately, this and other suggestions were rejected due to the general working 
attitude of the fire authority which as grown over the years, where they did not accept 
any kind of innovation in this respect. Instead of providing a cheaper roof which had to 
be renewed after several years, Carden Croft decided to offer a conventional roof, 
consisting of trusses and concrete tiles, guaranteed for 25 years and which should last in 
excess of 40 years. This variation pushed up the construction costs, but offered the less 
costly option over the life of the contract. This is a very good example of the 
opportunities which the designer is presented with in the PFI model compared to 
traditional procurement. Another area of improvement had Carden Croft come up with a 
better alternative for the specific non-slip tiles used for the appliance bay.  
The fire authority was innovative in its own way by trying to make the project 
affordable for the authority. As mentioned before, they will receive what is left in the 
sinking fund after 25 years. In addition, they get a share of the surplus, above what has 
been calculated in the financial model. Furthermore, the authority has set up a unique 
type of fund called a PFI equalisation fund. Early savings accrued from the project, 
which come from lower net cost to the authority using PFI compared to traditional 
procurement, will be placed into the fund. Assuming a rate of 7.25% on the money 
saved, the total net cost to the fire authority adds up to £180.000 in NPV terms. 
 
5.4  Case Study 3 – Ilkeston Police Station 
5.4.1 Introduction 
The Ilkeston Police Station is the first serviced accommodation PFI scheme in the 
police and local authority sector. It has been awarded as a PFI pathfinder scheme by the 
Home Office. The project is not, by any means, a large one, having a capital value of 
£2.7 million and a net present value of £5.3 million. 
 
The new police station is built on a new site replacing the 92 year old station at 
Wharncliffe Road and it serves an immediate population of 48,000 people. The 
building, providing accommodation for 106 officers, is a 1,345m² facility on two floors, 
and includes a 274m² custody suite on the ground floor. A secure and public parking is 
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integrated in the external area. In October 1998, the station became fully operational. 
Almost no information about the project was given by the police authority. Therefore, 
this case study primarily focuses on the consortium leader's perspective. 
 
5.4.2  The Project Timetable 
Table 9 shows a brief timetable from pre-qualification to occupation of the site. 
Task  Outturn 
Pre-qualification of bidders February  1996 
Long-listing of bidders  March 1996 
Short-listing of bidders  August 1996 
Selection of preferred bidder  November 1996 
Conditional closure  December 1997 
Home Office approval  December 1997 
Unconditional Signing  February 1998 
Start on Site  March 1998 
Practical Completion  September 1998 
Occupation October  1998 
Table 9: Project Timetable for Ilkeston Police Station 
 
The delay between the selection of the preferred bidder and the conditional closure was 
caused among other things by the development of rules and regulations for local 
authority PFI projects during that period. Another reason was that negotiations between 
the preferred bidder and the bank's lawyers became quite protracted. As a consequence 
the start on site occurred three months later than actually planned, but the project was 
still completed on time. In effect, the construction period was shortened to only 29 
weeks. The police authority had a big stake in making this happen, since they produced 
a very clear and complete output specification and had a project manger in place who 
resisted any unnecessary changes taking place. 
 
5.4.3 The  Contract 
5.4.3.1 The Contract Structure 
The SPV called Boltercourt Ltd is owned by John Kirkland, a director of Bowmer and 
Kirkland Ltd, and it was only set up for the purpose of the Ilkeston Police Station 
project. The design and build of the building services is carried out by Derry Building 
Services, including the mechanical and electrical installations. Keycare Ltd, as the 
facilities manager, has now subcontracted the maintenance of those services. Both, 
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Keycare Ltd and Derry Building Services Ltd are wholly owned subsidiaries of 
Bowmer and Kirkland Ltd. 
 





















































Figure 6: Contract Structure for Ilkeston Police Station 
 
5.4.3.2 The Consortium Leader Perspective 
Bowmer and Kirkland Ltd. is a 78 year old and 100% family owned company, which 
employs 1,300 people in 22 separate companies within the group. With an actual 
turnover of £420 million this year, the company is now 16
th or 17
th largest in the league 
table of UK construction companies. 
 
The involvement of the company in PFI projects started with the Ilkeston Police Station. 
Nowadays, the company has established its own PFI unit that works very closely with 
the design and build department. In 1996, when this PFI scheme came up, the concept 
of a whole-life-costing approach was new to the company. So they employed 
Chestertons FM to assist them in the calculation of the whole-life-costs. Bowmer and 
Kirkland are now able to do the whole-life-costing on their own, which also has benefits 
for traditional work where, for example, a client is interested in the long-term cost of a 
project. 
 
The bidding costs have been very high in respect to the size of the project. Legal cost 
made up the biggest proportion of bidding costs. The company saw the bidding costs as 
an investment in understanding the whole process. 
   50 
 
As mentioned before, Bowmer and Kirkland was able to reduce the construction period 
by three months, but only by taking a higher risk than planned. They commenced the 
detailed design, and placed orders for structural steelwork and precast concrete prior to 
unconditional signing in February 1998. It is also worthwhile to mention, that the 
facility was not only completed in time, but also within budget and to a high quality. 
 
Within the last 4 to 5 years, the company has adopted different roles in PFI deals. These 
have been as consortium leader, as happened at Ilkeston, or just being the construction 
specialist. Once they go for a construction contract, Bowmer and Kirkland always do 
the design for the facility.  
 
5.4.3.3 Contract Agreement and Service Specification 
Derbyshire police authority and Boltercourt Ltd. have signed a deal for 30 years with an 
option to extend for a further 20 years. The service provider is responsible for the 
following tasks: 
•  Building and engineering maintenance 
•  Cleaning and domestic services 
•  Catering / janitorial services 
•  Grounds maintenance services 
•  Furniture provision, replacement and maintenance 
•  Pest control 
•  Energy management 
•  Waste management (including disposal) 
 
The Constabulary retains responsibility for telephone, radio and IT equipment, but has 
to be connected to the service provider's infrastructure. Furthermore, services as the 
management of the custody suite from an operational point of view and taking 
responsibility for transporting prisoners are also met by the Constabulary. 
 
The care-taking, janitorial and cleaning services were to be substantially met by TUPE 
transferees from the existing Wharncliffe Road Station. That has assisted a smooth 
occupational start-up of the new police station. The scepticism regards TUPE transfers 
vanished by the way Bowmer and Kirkland approached this topic. New job 
descriptions, payment structure, corporate identity, uniforms, management structure and 
of course the new facility encouraged the transferees to settle in with enthusiasm. 
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5.4.3.4 Performance Standards and Payment Mechanism 
The unitary charge consists of a charge for performance and a charge for availability of 
the building. The penalty system for performance defaults is related to single categories 
of the service agreement and there will be a deduction of the overall charge if the 
service provider fails to perform correctly. The 'building and engineering maintenance' 
category was excluded from the performance charge, so that the sinking fund is 
protected. The contract structure test has been passed easily with around 28% of the 
unitary payment being on a variable performance charge. It should be noted, that there 
has not been any default during the last three years of operation. The procedure for 
monitoring and policing the service level agreement includes the following; Notices, 
Rectification Periods, Remediation Plans, Temporary and Permanent Solutions, Specific 
and Individual Penalties and so on. For the availability charge, the whole area is 
separated into five different priority zones, which impose different penalty deductions. 
 
Finally, there will be reviews of the performance and different benchmarks in certain 
areas of service provision.  
 
5.4.3.5 Project Funding 
Debt finance has been provided by Newcourt Capital Canada and represents 90% of 
overall funding. The remaining 10% are financed through equity capital by Bowmer and 
Kirkland. The negotiations with the bank's lawyers have been quite a problem and 
caused a significant delay prior unconditional signing. The bank did not want to take 
any risk, and so the legal cost were wrapped in the credit offer. Furthermore, the bank 
was very picky about the risk transfer in respect of the construction period. Having been 
frustrated after weeks of negotiations, Bowmer and Kirkland finally decided to finance 
the construction of the police station on their own and to take out the money from the 
bank once construction was finished. They could only do that, because they were quite 
cash rich. Nowadays, Bowmer and Kirkland offer this option as a bidding advantage 
depending on the size and duration of the contract. The interest rate for the debt finance 
was fixed at 1.5% above LIBOR as a swap rate at the day of contract signature. The 
return on equity, as assumed in the financial model, is calculated at around 15%. The 
return on construction cost was around 7%. 
 
5.4.3.6 Risk Allocation 
With regards to funding the project, Bowmer and Kirkland was prepared to take the risk 
on board they could control, i.e. they provided the finance for the construction of the 
building. But they eliminated the risk of interest rate changes, as this is something they 
cannot control. Furthermore, the company has introduced a separate index for the 
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energy cost apart from the usual retail price index which is used for the rest of the 
service payment. This was done due to the unpredictability of the energy cost in the 
market. The risks, which the police authority have retained, are: 
•  Changes in business rates and council tax. 
•  Operational changes requiring specific building and/or service variations. 
•  Wilful damage. 
•  Consequences of discriminatory legislative change. 
•  Financial consequences of any ultra virus ruling. 
•  Additional charges for special cleaning of cells. 




Bowmer and Kirkland have applied the whole-life-costing approach to all aspects of the 
project. As a consequence, they have tried to make the building as efficient and 
maintenance-free as possible. One example for this are the alternatives they considered 
for the floor finishing in the cellblock. The company also came up with a unique way of 
solving the custody suite construction in a very efficient way. This involved pre-cast 
concrete elements, which were made offsite. However, the particular rules of the Home 
Office design guide did not allow too many innovative solutions to be put in place by 
the constructor. 
 
Another positive move of the private sector partner was to involve the client all the way 
through and not only the decision makers but also those who are to become the 
occupiers and users of the building. This guaranteed that the phase of occupation went 
very smoothly. 
 
5.5  Analysis and Recommendations 
All three projects, that were selected for the case studies, have fulfilled the selection 
criteria as set out in 5.1. They represent a good mixture of local authorities and private 
sector partners. It is more an advantage than a disadvantage, that the consortium leader 
in case study 3 is not strictly a SME,  thus allowing opportunities for comparison. A 
summary of some key elements of the case studies is given in Table 10 on page 53. 




1  2  3 
Kind of fabric  Primary School  Fire Station  Police Station 
Net Present Value  £2.7million  £6.6million  £5.3million 
Contract Length  25 years  25 years  30 years 
PFI credit  £1.5 million  £4.7million  £3.8million 
Equity proportion  10 %  10 %  10 % 
Loan repayment period  10 years  20 years  Not known 
Type of interest rate for loan  Floating  Fixed  Fixed 
Period between OJEC notice 
and occupation of the 
building 
24 months  33 months  33 months 
Contract includes bench-
marking for the provided 
service 
Yes No  Yes 
Table 10: Key Elements of Case Studies 
 
The information used in this section is based on the case studies as well as on additional 
information gained from interviews. The additional information is based on current 
experiences made by the private sector parties, not necessarily having a direct link to the 
case studies, since all of them are still involved in PFI deals. 
 
The issues to be analysed should help the various parties involved in PFI projects to 
make the right decisions in the future. 
 
5.5.1 Procurement   
Two out of three local authorities have provided detailed information about the 
procurement process for a PFI project. The user of this information should bear in mind 
that all three projects have been among the first PFI projects within their departments. 
The procurement process has, therefore, been much looser than what needs to be done 
nowadays. Some important and current regulations for local authorities can be found in 
chapter 3. 
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Considering the number of companies who have expressed their real interest in the PFI 
projects, shows that only a few companies were definitely interested in bidding for such 
a project back in 1997. Nevertheless, all bidders went through a process of stiff 
competition. The bidders that were selected have made their first steps on climbing a 
steep learning curve and thereby gained a competitive advantage over other companies. 
Another question is, whether it is advantageous to select a preferred bidder and to keep 
a 2
nd bidder in the background or to go through a BAFO procedure. On the one hand, 
deciding to go for the BAFO route will create additional costs for all bidding 
companies, but on the other hand the competition among the bidding teams will be 
greater. Thus, offering a local authority a deal with a better value for money. Selecting a 
preferred bidder will have the advantage of a shorter procurement process with lower 
cost for bidders. However, this will only work if the reserve bidder is kept in the 
background to produce a detailed bid only when called upon to do so should the 
preferred bidder drop out. 
 
A problem has come to light in a situation where the PFI deal includes the acquisition of 
a new site in order to deliver the project. The search for a new site is usually restricted 
to a certain area, which limits the choice to only a few suitable sites. In this case, the site 
acquisition can become the decisive criteria in selecting the contractor, which is 
detrimental to the selection of the best contractor. Furthermore, the prices for possible 
sites would jump above market value, which would result in a higher contract price for 
the local authority. In order to avoid such a scenario, the local authority should acquire 
the site and let the bidders know about the price. 
 
Finally, the authority has to make it very clear what they require from the project in 
order to secure a smooth and fast procurement process. This means that the local 
authority should spend the right amount of time in developing an output specification 
which should not be subject of ongoing change afterwards. 
 
5.5.2  The Involvement of Legal Advisers 
The general opinion is for fees payable to lawyers to create unnecessary high bidding 
cost for the contractor. Most of the time the negotiations between the preferred bidder 
and their bank or the authority are protracted only by the legal side. The lawyers are 
paid for their time spent on the project and therefore do not have much interest coming 
to an agreement too soon. A situation ensues where the lawyers finally drive the process 
to come to unconditional signing and not, as it should be, the stakeholders of the 
project. The case studies incurred high legal cost as well, but this was due to the 
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situation where no document existed, which was ready to use by the local authorities 
and the contractors. 
 
In future, it will not be possible to agree on a fixed sum for legal advice. Nevertheless, it 
will be very important for the contractor to install a controlling mechanism, which 
provides a measure of transparency over a lawyer's budget and its use. Bowmer and 
Kirkland, for example, involved their lawyers very early in the project, only to review 
the documentation in a superficial way and to single out what seemed to be quite 
unusual. Afterwards, the lawyer was kept in the background until the company became 
short-listed as one of three. Additionally, the contractor should agree a budget with its 
legal advisers and let them report on a regular basis to account for expenditure against 
budget. 
 
5.5.3 Contract  Standardisation 
The case studies have been used as precedents by the government in order to bring the 
standardisation of contracts forward. A lot has been done until today to standardise 
contractual agreements and thereby making the procurement more cost-effective. But 
reality shows that the process of developing standardised contract templates is behind 
the market development of PFI projects. Coming to contract signature still produces 
very high bidding cost. Furthermore, the lawyers negotiate such elaborate contracts that 
they can be used for projects worth £ 20 million, which let’s one conclude that projects, 
as examined in the case studies, would not be carried out as a single project nowadays. 
Today, it is common to bundle such small projects together into one large package in 
order to obtain better value for money for the local authority, with the effect, that 
SME’s are excluded from bidding for such projects due to their size. So, there must be 
further development of simple contract templates for small projects, in order to make 
them affordable for the local authority and to ensure that the procurement process 
becomes less complicated and faster. 
 
SME’s have accounted for about 75% of all public construction work prior PFI for local 
authorities coming into action. With the introduction of PFI, bigger constructors have 
taken a large proportion of that 75%. Even if SME’s become subcontractors, they will 
loose a part of their workload and become increasingly dependent on bigger 
constructors. Meaning, that a large amount of their profit is transferred to bigger 
constructors and that many of the existing small and medium sized constructors is 
threatened. 
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5.5.4 Project  Funding 
The case studies demonstrate how there is a common structure for funding small PFI 
deals. A big proportion of the project finance is provided by debt funding and the 
remaining amount is put in as equity capital. It should be avoided, however, that there 
are too many equity holders forming an active part of the consortium, since this would 
create additional cost for due diligence among team members. The provision of equity 
capital is always a painful obligation for SME’s, as they generally lack sufficient capital 
resources. The establishment of a market for trading equity capital, as mentioned in 4.4, 
does not seem to be a feasible prospect for smaller PFI projects. Furthermore, banks do 
not want to take any risk. Therefore, the contractor is very often asked to provide a 
parent company guarantee for the construction period, which returns the non-recourse 
finance to limited recourse finance. Even more frustrating for smaller contractors is the 
fact that bigger companies are able to cover all the construction risk of smaller projects 
directly by pre-financing the construction of the building with own cash reserves, see 
section 5.4.3.5. 
 
The case studies have shown, that the interest rate for debt finance is not a significant 
issue to prevent SMEs to bid for a PFI project. One explanation could be that the most 
significant risk, represented by construction risk, is covered by guarantees or the like. 
Another reason points to the local authority as a client representing one of the best 
covenants. Finally, it must be said that PFI for procuring public buildings have proved 
to be less risky than anticipated by local authorities and banks. This realisation should 
strengthen the banks’ confidence in providing smaller contractors a good deal as well by 




The dominant advantage of PFI compared to traditional procurement lies in the 
combination of construction and operation of a building. With traditional procurement, 
the public sector will always try to build as cheap as possible, due to the lack of capital 
resources, without taking into account the higher maintenance and operational cost later 
on. The case studies have shown that the contractors have used the whole-life-costing 
approach to create a better deal for the local authority. The buildings have been 
designed to be as maintenance free as possible over the life of the contract. The 
restrictive design guides and regulations of the local authorities were a hindrance for 
further innovation by the contractors with regards to whole life costs. It is important to 
note that the approach of whole-life-costing has been a new method of designing a 
building for the private sector as well as for the local authorities. The contractors have 
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transferred this knowledge gained from PFI to their traditional work, thus giving them a 
further competitive advantage. 
 
5.5.6 Risk  Allocation 
The transfer of risk to the private sector is the most important issue for local authorities 
to consider in order to obtain value for money. The local authorities of the case studies 
have tried to pass as much risk as they could to the private contractor. It should be kept 
in mind, that the private sector can bear all the risk which can be priced, but it only 
makes sense to transfer the risk when it is cheaper for the contractor to do so. A good 
example in all case studies was the discussion of who would bear the risk of an increase 
in the business rates. Finally, the local authorities took that risk, because they assumed 
that it would be cheaper for them over the long term of the contract. 
 
6 Summary 
The introduction of PFI in local government required a rethink by local authorities and 
the private sector alike, it being a complete new way of procuring public buildings as 
part of public infrastructure. The legal and financial framework for local authorities had 
to be changed in order to make PFI work within local government. The short-term 
involvement of construction contractors in the role of builders only has changed to a 
long-term relationship between local authorities and the private sector, who is now 
financier, designer, builder and operator. 
 
The case studies show that it was possible to procure small projects during the early 
days of PFI in local government, thus enabling smaller companies to take on a leading 
role. But regulations and approval frameworks for local authority PFI schemes have 
become tighter. This has led to the current situation where local authorities are moving 
towards large schemes or where they bundle several small schemes together in order to 
gain better value for money. Inevitably, smaller constructors are excluded from 
becoming consortium leaders or construction contractors. The original workload of 
smaller constructors is thereby transferred to the bigger construction companies. Before 
SME’s can go out again and look for opportunities in the PFI market, the government is 
asked to simplify contract agreements and to produce standardised contractual modules 
to bring small PFI schemes back to life. 
 
Another important result of the study is to show that there is not a single best solution 
for a well working contract structure. The nature of the PFI model has provided 
opportunities for small architectural and facilities management companies to play a vital 
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role in the future PFI market. Those enterprises should be encouraged to consider the 
PFI market as a market niche they can step into, whereas small and medium sized 
construction companies are suffering from the Private Finance Initiative. 
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Appendix A 
Calculation of actual Council Tax     
  Authority X 
(Low SSA, high 
resource) 
Authority Y 
(High SSA, low 
resource) 
 
Scenario 1:  Assuming Budget Requirement set at Standard Spending Assessment 
Budget requirement 
less income from redistributed business rates 
less Revenue Support Grant 
= Actual Council Tax needed 
  £310.00 million 
- £135.00 million 
- £  54.35 million 
  £120.65 million 
  £360.00 million 
- £135.00 million 
- £136.10 million 
  £  88.90 million 
Divided by the council’s estimate of Council Tax base (this  
assumes they will collect Council Tax from  97% of their 
Council Tax base) 
÷ 184,300  ÷ 135,800 
Equals  Council Tax level for band D  = £654.64  = £654.64  
Note: The budget requirement is equal to the Standard Spending Assessment, and both councils 
make the same estimates of the proportion of the Council Tax base they will successfully collect 
Council Tax from, so the Council Tax level set is identical.  This is achieved because the Revenue 
Support Grant lets councils set the same Council Tax if they set their budget requirements at the 
level of their Standard Spending Assessments . 
 
Scenario 2:  Assuming Budget Requirement set 5% above Standard Spending Assessment 
Budget requirement 
less income from redistributed business rates 
less Revenue Support Grant 
= Actual Council Tax needed 
  £325.50 million 
- £135.00 million 
- £  54.35 million 
  £136.15 million 
  £378.00 million 
- £135.00 million 
- £136.10 million 
  £106.90 million 
Divided by the council’s estimate of Council Tax base (this  
assumes they will collect Council Tax from  97% of their 
Council Tax base) 
÷ 184,300  ÷ 135,800 
Equals Council Tax level for band D  = £738.74  = £787.19 
Note: With the budget requirement 5% above Standard Spending Assessment, authority Y has to 
raise an extra £18 million (compared with authority X’s £15.5 million), and has a smaller Council Tax 
base from which to raise it.  So, the Council Tax level for authority Y is higher than that for authority 
X. 
 
Scenario 3: Assuming Budget requirement set 5% below Standard Spending Assessment 
Budget requirement 
less income from redistributed business rates 
less Revenue Support Grant 
= Actual Council Tax needed 
  £294.50 million 
- £135.00 million 
- £  54.35 million 
  £105.15 million 
  £342.00 million 
- £135.00 million 
- £136.10 million 
  £  70.90 million 
Divided by the Council’s estimate of Council Tax base for 
tax-setting purposes (this  assumes they will collect 
Council Tax from  97% of their Council Tax base) 
÷ 184,300  ÷ 135,800 
Equals Council Tax level for band D:  = £570.54   = £522.09 
Note: If budget requirements are set below Standard Spending Assessment, the Council Tax level 
for authority Y will be lower than for authority X. 
 
















































Population x Distributable Amount per head = 












Council Tax base x  
Council Tax for Standard Spending = 














Standard Spending Assessment 
Less income from redistributed business rates 
Less standard Council Tax income 
= Revenue Support Grant 
 
  
  £310.00 million 
- £135.00 million 
- £120.65 million 
  £ 54.35 million 
 
  
  £360.00 million 
- £135.00 million 
- £  88.90 million 





Both authorities have the same population.  However, authority X has a lower Standard Spending 
Assessment (SSA) but higher resources (in terms of the Council Tax it should receive if it set its 
Council Tax at the same level as Council Tax for Standard Spending). So authority X needs less 
Revenue Support Grant to make up the difference between its SSA and its resources. 
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Appendix B 
Private Finance Transaction – Regulation 16 
The definition of a PFT under Regulation 16 is set out as follows: 
“Meaning of a private finance transaction 
16(1)  in this regulation-“asset” means- 
(a)  any tangible asset, including (in particular) any land, house, or other 
building, plant, machinery, vehicle, vessel, apparatus or equipment; or  
 
(b)  any computer software; “relevant asset” means any asset apart from 
housing land; and “works” means any works consisting of the 
construction, enhancement, replacement or installation of an asset, 
apart from works consisting of the construction of a house or other 
dwelling on housing land. 
 
(2)    For the purposes of this Part, a transaction is a private finance 
transaction if  
 
(a)    the consideration received by the Authority under the transaction 
includes- 
 
(i)  the provision or making available of a relevant asset or the 
carrying out of works for the purposes of, or in connection with, 
the discharge of a function of the Authority; and 
 
(ii)  the provision of services for the provision of, or in connection 
with, the discharge of the same function; 
 
(b)    the Authority do not give to any other person any indemnity or 
guarantee in respect of any liabilities of the person with whom they 
enter into the transaction (whether those liabilities are incurred in 
respect of the transaction or otherwise); 
 
(c)    the consideration given by the Authority under the transaction 
includes the payment of fees by instalments at annual or more 
frequent intervals; 
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d)   the fees are determined in accordance to factors which in every case 
include- 
 
(i)   standards attained in the performance of the services; or  
 
(ii)   the extent, rate or intensity of use of the relevant asset, or, as the 
case may be, of the asset which is constructed, enhanced, 
replaced or installed under the transaction; and  
 
(e)    the first instalment of fees falls to be paid after the services have 
started to be provided.” 
 
 
The New Regulation 40 – effective from 1 April 2000 
 
40(1)  A credit arrangement which is a private finance transaction shall be excluded 
from section 49(2), and the initial cost and the cost at any time of the 
arrangement shall be nil, if the authority determine that in accordance with 
proper practices no item, other than an item specified in paragraph (2), is 
required to be recognised as an asset in any balance sheet they are required to 
prepare in accordance with such practices for the financial year in which the 
credit arrangement comes into being with respect to property which is either: 
 
(a) provided or made available under the transaction; or 
 
(b) constructed, enhanced, replaced or installed under the transaction. 
 
(2)  The following items are specified for the purposes of paragraph (1): 
 
(a) any item relating to a contribution by the authority of an asset to any person 
with whom they enter into the private finance transaction in return for a 
reduction in the consideration payable by the authority to that person under 
the transaction; or 
 
(b) any item relating to an asset to be provided or made available under the 
private finance transaction by any person which is transferred into the 
ownership of the authority, whether or not upon payment of any consideration 
by the authority, at the end of the contract term relating to the transaction. 
 